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PREFACE 
This dissertation concerns the Communaute Financiere 
Africaine (CFA) countries and their practic.e of collectively 
pegging their currency, the CFA franc, to t~e French franc 
as well as its effects on their trade performa~ce and their 
pattern of trade. This collective peg to the French franc 
is otherwis.e known as a single peg and the objective i,s to 
look at the competitive aspects of this type of exchange 
rate regime and the question being asked is whether it 
causes trade bias by discouraging attempts by the CFA coun-
tries to diversify their trade with nonFrench partners. A 
related issue is whether the French authorities have inter-
vened successfully in the foreign exchangemarket to stabi-
lize the fluctuation of the French franc against other major 
currencies. This is important because if the French franc is 
not stable, the CFA franc cannot be stable; if the CFA franc 
is not stable, .its fluctuation will be arbitrarily deter-
mined by the behavior of the French franc. This will have 
economic consequences that are not the policy objectives of 
the CFA countries. 
An important issue and the focus of the research in 
this dissertation is the pattern of trade of the CFA coun-
tries in relation to their competitors and their trading 
iv 
partners, and the role played by their choice of exchange 
rate regime. 
The pattern of international trade has been one of the 
major preoccupations of international economists and policy 
makers. Certain aspects of the pattern of trade are easy to 
comprehend. Thus climate and natural resource endowments 
explain why some countries export oil, others export apples, 
while others export pineapples. But much of the pattern of 
trade is not due to such obvious reasons. For instance, one 
has to look deeper to explain why Japan, a nation with few 
natural resources, has become the world's leading trading 
power and a fierce competitor of the United States and other 
industrial countries in electronics and automobile trade. 
For the purpose of studying the impact of single peg-
ging on the trade performance of the CFA countries relative 
to their competitors, a sample of eleven coffee exporters 
and nine coffee importers was taken. For cocoa, the sample 
consisted of six exporting countries and seven importing 
countries. The choice of exporting countries reflected the 
diversity of exchange rate regimes among developing coun-
tries today (i.e., French franc peggers, Dollar peggers, SDR 
peggers and relatively more flexible regimes such as the 
crawling or gliding peg). The choice of coffee and cocoa 
for analysis reflected the fact that these commodities are 
the main source of foreign exchange earnings for the coun-
tries studied. The study was intended to determine the 
extent to which relative prices, exchange risk and the 
v 
choice of exchange rate regime affected the market shares of 
the exporters. This was done using a demand side analysis 
based on Armington's framework. In this framework, exports 
of a given kind are viewed as differentiated by origin. The 
conclusion from this assumption is that the demand curve 
facing coffee and cocoa exporters is 'not infinitely elastic 
as is usually claimed for primary products. It is therefore 
conceivable, as i~ usually the case in the theory of imper-
fect competition, that each country exporting coffee or 
cocoa faces a downward, albeit relatively flat, demand curve 
for its exports. This means that it has some control over 
price. The main' point is that in such imperfectly competi-
tive situations, sellers can vie for market share through 
price or nonprice competition (i.e., through real or 
perceived differences). Real differences can come about 
through better quality or lower prices to the buyer, which 
will increase demand and th~refore the market share of the 
seller. 
In this study, the focus was on how the real price of 
coffee or cocoa, exchange risk and choice of exchange rate 
regime affected their market share or export demand. The 
results showed that exchange rate regime does affect market 
share. This is because the coefficient of the relative 
' ' 
price variable, which measures the,elasticity of substitu-
tion in demand in the importing countries, was significant 
in all cases. The results showed unquestionably that being 
pegged to the French franc had a negative impact on the per-
vi 
formance of the CFA countries in their export markets rela-
tive to their competitors. 
With regard to the scope of the dissertation, while 
prior studies on the trade pattern of developing countries 
used an aggregate approach and ~ere therefore more concerned 
with issues of elasticity pessimism, it used a disaggregated 
analysis by focusing on specific SITC commodity categories. 
Its focus was the competitiveness of the CFA country exports 
measured by the ratio of an index of their export price rel-
ative to a weighted average of the export prices of their 
competitors in given export markets. The research was con-
fined to determining if the peg of the CFA franc to the 
French franc, and the joint float that this implies, 
increased uncertainty and had a negative impact on their 
trade shares. The results confirmed this. 
The special difficulties encountered in this effort 
were the lack of original,data especially exporter's supply 
price in the matrix of bilateral flows. As a result, unit 
values were used as a proxy. Another difficulty encountered 
was that because the CFA countries are French-speaking and 
located in Africa, original.data on them would have been 
accessible only by traveling to West and Central Africa or 
to France. The same problem would have been encountered 
with their competitors located in Asia and South America. 
Financial constraints ruled out this possibility. So there 
was much reliance on secondary data sources, mainly IMF and 
UN publications. 
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CHAPTER I 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
The CFA Franc Zone and' Problems of 
Adjustment -and Convergence 
_, 
The CFA countries encountered several economic problems 
in the 1980s: 
1. current account and"public sector deficits; 
2. debt service ·probl~ms; 
3. macroE;conomic problems. (inflation and unemploy-
ment); and 
4. poverty or growth problems (declining or_ stagnant 
per capita GNP). 
It would be too ambitious to attempt to address all 
these problems in one study. So the focus here is on the 
role of the institutional arrangement {i.e., membership in 
the CFA zone) in affecting internal and external balance. 
Specifically, it looks at how zone. membership has hindered 
economic adjustment in the CFA countries. A related issue 
is to look at how the CFA zone's. choice to peg the CFA franc 
to the French franc has been a source of their economic and 
'' 
financial problems. This will help to determine the partial 
cause or causes of these problems so that appropriate 
1 
2 
policies can be adopted. The study is a contribution to the 
literature on the debates now raging about the viability and 
desirability of the zone in its present structure.' 
The first part of the study looks at how the structure 
of the zone contributes to internal and external disequilib-
ria. This is done using a ~imple .. model. of an open economy 
under a fixed exchange rate.' It is shown that zone member-
ship leads to a trade-off between internal imbalance and ex-
ternal balance. 
The second part of the study then examines how zone 
membership affects economic adjustment in the CFA countries. 
This is done using a-simple model of balance of payments 
adjustment under a fixed exchange rate to show how economic 
adjustment is affected by certain institutional features of 
the zone. It is shown that ~conomic adjustment is hindered 
by rigidities in the zone resulting from the abdication of 
monetary and exchange rate tools, and by lack of fiscal and 
monetary discipline which are the vaunted advantages of sin-
gle pegging. With fiscal· policy as the major tool to rely 
on, these countries face the added policy problem of using 
one tool to address intern~l and external imbalance_ prob-
lems, leading to the possibility of a trade~off between the 
two. 
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Structure of the CFA Zone 
The CFA zone comprises eleven francophone countries and 
one Spanish-sp~aking country, which have formed two monetary 
unions: 
1. the West African Monetary Union whose members are 
Senegal, .Ivory Coast, Burkina Fasso, Togo, Niger, 
and Benin; and 
2. the Central African Monetary Union whose members 
are Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, Congo, Central African 
Republic, and the only Spanish-speaking member, 
Equatorial Guinea. 
Each union'has a central ,bank which coordinates mone-
tary policy for its members. A ,common currency, the CFA 
franc, circulates within each union. 
Both unions have a monetary cooperation with France 
characterized by (Engberg, 1973): 
1. a fixed parity (1 .French franc = 50 CFA francs) 
between the CFA franc and the French franc which 
has remained unchanged since 1948; 
2. free and "unlimited" convertibility between the 
CFA franc and the French franc; 
3. guarantee by France of the external convertibility 
of the CFA franc through the operations account 
mechanism at the French Treasury. By this mecha-
nism~ the union banks are required to deposit 65% 
of member countries' foreign exchange reserves 
holdings in this account. The French treasury 
then manages the account for the purpose of guar-
anteeing the external convertibility of the CFA 
franc; 
4. harmonization of exchange control regulations to 
permit free capital mobility within the zone; and 
5. common monetary policy for all member countries 
such as ceilings on credit to the government (at 
most 20% of fiscal revenues for the previous 
year), and credit allocation to the private sec-
tor. 
This policy of limits and of credit control is intended 
to preserve monetary stability and external balance, and to 
promote economic development of member countries. 
Union Objectives and Reality 
The achievement of these objectives of the unions has 
been no easy task. The reality is that in the 1980s, the 
system has been fraught with problems, as can be gleaned 
from news paper reports. The first indication of stress on 
the system was reported in 1987 (West Africa Magazine, Aug., 
1987) when Ivory Coast expressed its desire to devalue the 
CFA franc because it was experiencing budgetary shortfalls 
as well as external and internal economic problems. The 
magazine, Jeune Afrigue (oriented towards francophone coun-
tries), has alluded to zone problems in some of its issues. 
Pointing to the ambiguity of relationships in the franc zone 
between the CFA countries and France, it observed (Jeune 
Afrique, Sept. 1989) " ... while it contributes to monetary 
stability, it smacks of neocolonialism" (my translation). 
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The system is also seen as contributing to the stagna-
tion of salaries (i.e., slow growth in per capita income). 
One issue (Jeune Afrique, Sept. 1989) asks if the CFA franc 
should be devalued and points out that an overvalued CFA 
franc could discourage exports and contribute to external 
imbalance. Another issue (Jeune Afrique, Oct. 1989) talks 
about "the rumors of devaluation of the CFA franc and of the 
possible disintegration of the franc zone," and how these 
were quickly laid to rest by French and African Finance 
authorities who met to discuss the problems of the zone. 
Also on their agenda was "the debts" of some of the zone 
countries and "the bank crisis" within the zone. Finally, 
as an indication of the severity and graveness of the situa-
tion in the CFA zone, one issue (Jeune Afrique, Apr. 1990) 
talks about "the bitter pill" (draconian measures) that the 
Ivory Coast has had to swallow to avoid bankruptcy such as 
salary cut-backs, budgetary cut-backs with attendant early 
forced retirement of civil servants, not to mention outright 
refusal by the government to pay up any accumulated back-
pay. Similar measures are. reported for Cameroon (Jeune 
Afrique, Mar. 1990). 
The interest in the franc zone has not only been moti-
vated by the newspaper reports, but also by the fact that 
the international monetary system underwent a transformation 
in 1973 from the Bretton Woods system of fixed but 
adjustable peg regimes to the floating or managed float. 
regime among the major currencies. This transformation had 
6 
some implications for a single peg regime and has been exam-
ined under the theory of optimal peg (Williamson, 1982). 
This study examines a specific case of a single peg; 
i.e., the peg of the CFA franc to the French franc in·a dif-
ferent di~e~sion, not just.in terms of minimizing real 
exchange rate variability as ha's been done in the optimal 
peg theory.· That is, it looks at single pegging of the CFA 
franc to the French franc and why it has hindered economic 
adjustment in the CFA countries. 
Implications of Transformation of Inter-
national Monetary System for French 
Franc-Pegging Countries 
For a minor currency that·is,pegged to a major cur-
rency, such as the CFA franc peg to the French franc, the 
transformation of the international monetary system means 
basically that both currencies move jointly and simultane-
ously against1 other currencies that float against.the Frenc~ 
fr~n·c. Hence,. whatever happens to the French franc affects · 
the CFA franc accordingly. 
Economic conditions in these countries are very dissim-
ilar and call for different po~icies to address specific 
circumstances. But the unchanging par·ity between both cur-
rencies can create problems such as balance of payments 
deficits, domestic unemployment andjor inflation. These 
problems will then need to be addressed with suitable poli-
cies such as fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange rate 
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policy, or a combination of these. This requires control by 
the CFA countries over these instruments of policy. But 
because of their affiliation with the monetary union and the 
franc zone, their commitment to union objectives and to mon-
etary cooperation with France means that they have to abdi-
cate the active use of these stabilization tools for steer-
ing their economies in desired directions. It also forces 
them to sacrifice domestic macroeconomic objectives for the 
sake of attaining union objectives. This dialectic between 
individual country objectives and union objectives can 
result in serious conflicts of interest which can threaten 
the foundation and stability of the union and sometimes 
might even lead to its disintegration. 
To understand .the predicament of the CFA countries, it 
will be instructive to look, at the Currency Board System in 
anglophone Africa. Institutional problems are dealt with in 
Kratz & Shannon (1966) and also in Ord & Livingston (1978), 
King (1979), and Furness (1975). Valuable lessons can be 
learned from their origin, functioning and disintegration. 
It will be seen that the operation ,of the currency Board 
system was in many ways similar to that of the CFA franc 
zone system [Liddell, (1979) and Engberg, (1973) give the 
English description; Kouadio (1984), Alibert (1983), and 
Ossa & Lapiquonne (1984) give the French]. It was also 
known as the sterling area, a monetary union whereby the 
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anglophone African countries pegged their currencies to the 
(metropolitan) pound sterling. After the international 
monetary transformation in 1973, most of them deserted the 
sterling peg. By contrast, the CFA countries have remained 
steadfastly pegged to the French franc. This begs the 
question "Why?" It is best tackled by seeking an 
explanation for the disintegration of the sterling peg sys-
tern and this calls for a closer examination of the Currency 
Board System which laid down the ground rules for the opera-
tion of the sterling peg. 
The Currency Board System 
An indication of the cause of the break-up of this sys-
tern can be discerned from the statement of an East African 
politician-economist, Mwai ~ibaki, the Kenyan Minister of 
Finance in the early 1970s. He said (King, 1979): 
An essential ingredient of economic independence 
is the ability of a country to formulate and exe-
cute her own economic and social policies (p. 57). 
This point of view is echoed by a French analyst 
(Vallee, 1989) who says: 
la monnaie est indissociable de la question de 
l'Etat ..•• L'aspect "administre" de la creation 
monetaire en Afrique ... allait bien sur contre 
!'expansion du credit et le developpement de la 
circulation monetaire (p. 31). 
or, 
the State and money are one •.•• That money 
creation in Africa was "dict~ted," •.. hindered 
the expansion of credit and development of mone-
tary flows" (my translation). 
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Either way, the emphasis is on policy autonomy. The 
operation of both systems led to the demand for autonomy, 
starting with the Currency Board System. The sterling peg 
regime was an off-shoot of the Currency Board system which 
evolved in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the 
early part of the twentieth century. The West African 
currency Board was established in 1912 and its members were 
Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone. The East African 
Currency Board was established in 1919 and included Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zanzibar, and for a time, Somaliland, 
Aden and Ethiopia. These boards issued local currency at a 
fixed parity in exchange for the (metropolitan) currency, 
sterling, and also redeemed currency for sterling. Ini-
tially, the local currency was fully backed by' sterling 
assets. 
The main advantage of the system was that it generated 
financial confidence due to the currency being backed by the 
metropolitan currency .. But it was criticized on several 
grounds (Furness, 1975): 
1. because foreign exchange earnings to back the 
local currency were held in sterling assets, it 
deprived the African countries of scarce funds 
which could have been used for development pur-
poses; 
2. for the African countries that had just gained 
political independence, it was a poor substitute 
for their own central banks which could serve not 
10 
only as a symbol of sovereignty (money and the 
state are indissociable), but also as a tool to 
foster and regulate the domestic financial system, 
to provide financial guidance and service to the 
government in economic planning for growth, and to 
carry out monetary policy; 
3. the policy of the expatriate-owned banks was 
unduly influenced by the economic conditions which 
prevailed in the metropolitan country rather than 
the conditions in the territories; 
4. by investing reserves and liquid assets in the 
money market of an international financial center 
in London, the commercial banks were said to be 
exporting savings from a capital-poor country to a 
capital-rich country; and 
5. the banks applied conventional criteria of credit-
worthiness which were beyond the reach of the 
average native customer, and showed an unwill-
ingness to extend sufficient credit to native bor-
rowers as well as a lack of concern with the pro-
motion of domestic industry and trade (pp. 51-54). 
While measures were taken to correct some of these 
problems (such as indigenization of the banks, orientation 
of lending and investment policies to meet domestic needs), 
in most territories, this process was regarded as inade-
quate. The banking and credit system was regarded as one of 
the most important and powerful instruments for fostering 
11 
economic development. Thus the feeling was that it was po-
litically and economically wrong that this vital tool should 
be under the control of foreigners. This led to a demand in 
each territory for the establishment of a central bank and 
for the indigenization of the commercial banks so as to pro-
vide the monetary authorities with more power of control 
over the commercial banks to pursue goals more relevant to 
the domestic economy. Specific courses of action that were 
taken to achieve these objectives ranged from complete 
nationalization of the banking system, domestic incorpora-
tion of banks, state participation in commercial banking 
through government purchase of shares, and the establishment 
of wholly-owned indigenous banks to compete with the expa-
triate-owned banks. For example, complete nationalization 
of the banking system was undertaken by Tanzania. Kenya, 
Nigeria, Uganda, Malawi, and Zambia provide examples of 
State participation in commercial banking through government 
purchase of shares in foreign-owned banks. Finally, wholly-
owned indigenous banks could be found in Nigeria, Uganda, 
and Ghana (Furness, 1975). 
In contrast to these changes that have occurred in the 
banking systems of the anglophone countries, there has been 
far less revision of the banking system in francophone coun-
tries where even today nearly all -the commercial banks are 
expatriate-owned. France still exerts a strong influence on 
the unions (through its being represented in the central 
banks' boards) and on the franc zone (through management of 
the foreign exchange reserves of the CFA countries; i.e, 
operations account) • 
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Besides the issue of central bank control, the exchange 
rate arrangement within the sterling area caused problems 
which gave the colonial territories little room for maneuver 
in matters of exchange rate policy. This can be seen by 
looking at the features of the exchange rate arrangement in 
the sterling area. The local currencies of the territories 
were linked directly to sterling, through a sterling exchange 
standard, whereby the currency Boards stood ready to convert 
the local currencies into pounds at a fixed parity. 
The features of the system were (Ord & Livingston, 
1978): 
1. Britain held gold and dollar reserves for the 
sterling area; 
2. sterling area members were required to economize 
on scarce currencies through exchange controls to 
preserve the exchange rate for sterling; 
3. in exchange, Britain permitted greater freedom of 
capital and current account transactions from 
Britain to the rest of the sterling area; and 
4. Britain acted as international banker for the 
sterling area whose foreign exchange reserves were 
kept in London as sterling-balances. A country 
experiencing a balance of payments deficit could 
draw on these balances to finance imports. If the 
sterling area as a whole was experiencing a bal-
ance of payments deficit relative to non-sterling 
areas, Britain, as banker for the sterling area, 
would pay out whatever currency was required. As 
Britain's total short term liabilities tended to 
exceed the short term assets (claims to foreign 
reserves), the exchange rate of the pound and 
Britain's balance of payments caused much concern 
to the sterling area members. 
13 
Another source of concern for the sterling area ·members 
was their experience with the effects of devaluation of the 
pound due to the sterling peg. During the sterling peg 
period, the pound was devalued twice. When it was devalued 
in 1949, sterling countries followed Britain and devalued 
concurrently since (Ord & Livingston, 1978): 
1. due to the colonial.structure of trade, they 
exported mostly to Britain; 
2. they depended on imports of British capital funds 
and failure to devalue concurrently would have 
compromised capital imports if British investors 
had to give up more pounds to get the same amount 
of a territory's currency that was not devalued 
concurrently with the pound; 
3. their currency and other reserves held in sterling 
balances would suffer a capital loss by depreciat-
ing in value; and 
4. territories on the legally-based sterling exchange 
standard were effectively using sterling as domes-
tic currency and could not adopt a different 
exchange rate to that of Britain. 
14 
The pound was again devalued in 1967. The two British 
devaluations occurred during the Bretton Woods era when the 
pound was relatively fixed. Most sterling area countries 
remained pegged to the pound despite the inconveniences of 
the devaluations. The benefits of staying pegged must have 
more than offset the costs and inconveniences of the two 
devaluations. But since 1973, when the international mone-
tary system changed to floating among the major currencies, 
most of the sterling area countries have long since given up 
their peg to the pound. This can be attributed partly to 
(King, 1979) : 
1. their experience with pre-1973 inconveniences with 
the peg resulting from the institutional con-
straints to which they were subjected, namely: 
2. inability to use the exchange rate as an instru-
ment of policy. 
3. abdication of use of domestic monetary policy 
resulting from the guarantee of free convertibil-
ity into sterling at a fixed exchange rate. In 
effect, this transformed the sterling area into an 
extension of the British financial system. Hence 
the lending behavior of the commercial banks oper-
ating in this area were influenced more by their 
head offices in London than by the local authori-
ties in the territories. Thus there was no reason 
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why their lending and deposits in any single ter-
ritory should bear a particular relationship to 
one another; 
4. holding of sterling reserve assets to back up the 
issue of domestic currency; and 
5. limited latitude for the fiscal authorities to 
print money (i.e., borrow from central bank). 
It is worth pointing out at this point that there is a 
close parallel between the history, characteristics, func-
tioning and experience of the sterling area and the CFA 
franc area which was the French counterpart of the currency 
board system during the coloniql period. To quote a passage 
from a French scholar (Vallee, 1989): 
La Republique ... s'efforce de trouver dans 
l'empire un nouveau ressort qui passe par 
l'extension de la circulation monetaire, par une 
plus grande contiguite des mecanismes financiers 
et par une homogeneisation des flux d'echanges. 
o o o l'eS banqUeS ayant le privilege d I emettre la 
seule monnaie legale etaient soumises a des regles 
strictes du regime d'emissions, soit qu'elles 
observent un plafond fixe par decret, soit 
qu'elles conservent une encaisse de contrepartie 
des billets en circulation. L'aspect "administre" 
de la creation monetaire en Atrique ... allait 
bien sur contre l'expansion du credit et le 
developpement de la circulation monetaire (p. 33). 
This quotation says: 
The Republic (French) sought (to expand French 
interests in its territories) by extending its 
monetary and financial pri~ciples overseas in 
order to integrate trade flows. (For this purpose) 
Banks (in the territories) that could issue money 
were subject to strict control either through 
ceilings on money creation placed by law, or by 
being required to hold assets to back up the cur-
rency in circulation. This "administered" nature 
of money creation in Africa worked against the 
expansion of credit and the development of the 
monetary system (my translation). 
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Thus the CFA franc zone operated on the same principles 
as the sterling zone and both basically shared the same 
experiences. 
That the sterling peggers quit the peg can also be par-
tially attributed to the inconveniences of the post-1973 
experience with the pound peg~ 
This can be referred to as.the problem of single peg-
ging under floating major currencies or joint floating. By 
1973, most anglophone and francophone African countries had 
achieved political independence. As part of their desire to 
assert their independence, ~ost had also been trading more 
and more with non-metropolitan countries. This was impor-
tant due to the heavily bilateral and involuntary nature of 
pre-independence trade between the territories and the 
metropolitan countries. Post-independence trade was not 
heavily one-sided as it had been during the colonial era. 
It reflected the desire of the new nations to diversify 
their trade towards new partners. 
Under these circumstances, the argument for single peg-
ging (that it frees the pegging country from having to deal 
with uncertainty due to changing exchange rates if it trades 
mostly with the numeraire currency count~y), was no longer 
tenable. The literature on optimal pegging studied the 
issue of joint floating and demonstrated that single pegging 
under floating is bad policy if the pegging country is 
engaged in multilateral trade. CFA zone trade has diversi-
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fied considerably since attainment of independence, as Table 
I shows. 
Countries: 
U.S.A. 
France 
Netherlands 
w. Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
U.S.A. 
France 
Netherlands 
Italy 
w. Germany 
U.K. 
U.S.A. 
France 
U.K. 
Italy 
Netherlands 
w. Germ. 
TABLE I 
EXPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES OF DESTIN-
ATION: VALUE AS PERCENTAGE 
OF WORLD TRADE 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Cameroon 
2.7 2.8 4.8 5.5 20.8 30.2 37.7 40.1 22.7 14.2 
26.8 25.4 28.3 33.7 25.1 21.8 19.3 15. 8 30. 0 32. 9 
21.4 22.6 27.3 2'7.8 20.8 19.2 14.2 19.5 19.7 21.5 
7.4 8.8 10.4 7.5 4.3 6.0 5.8 5.0 5.6 6.3 
3.9 6.3 8.1 7.1 6.8 8.2 5.0 4.2 3.6 5.5 
4.0 3.9 2.0 2.0 3.7 2.2 1.4 1.2 1.6 2.1 
Ivory Coast 
10.4 11.7 14.5 9.5 8.3 11.4 14.0 12.4 15.0 12.7 
25.4 25.5 23.2 23.7 21.7 18.5 19.6 19.0 16.4 17.9 
13.1 14.9 18.7 17.4 13.6 13.1 12.2 11.6 16.4 10.3 
9.2 8.5 5.7 8.4 11.5 7.9 8.7 8.8 6.4 9.9 
7.2 5.3 4.8 5.8 8.6 6.6 4.5 3.9 5.2 5.8 
4.0 3.7 3.7 4.5 3.5 3.9 3.5 4.5 3.4 4.7 
Senegal 
7.4 5.4 8.4 7.7 4.7 4.4 4.5 3.7 3.2 3.1 
48.3 47.0 44.7 41.7 44.7 32.0 21.3 29.431.7 30.6 
6.0 7.4 8.4 5.7 7.2 6.1 5.1 4.1 5.3 5.7 
2.9 5.2 4.7 1.3 4.7 1.9 .6 3.1 4.1 2.7 
3.6 3.3 1.9 1.1 .9 .4 .4 3.4 4.1 2.7 
1.2 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.5 1.2 1.8 1.9 1.1 
Source: UN: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics: various 
issues 
I I 
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What emerges from Table I is a downward trend of trade 
between the CFA countries and France, their colonial trading 
partner. The trend of trade diversification away from this 
traditional partner is shown by rising shares with the non-
French partners. 
As can be seen, their trade is no longer solely with 
the metropolitan country. It has become increasingly multi-
lateral in nature. Thus by pegging to a single currency, 
instead of' a basket of currencies, only one source of vari-
ability and uncertainty is eliminated. Only a part of 
external disturbances due to exchange rate fluctuations is 
therefore eliminated. The other part will persist and be a 
source of economic.problems. To avoid this situation, it 
will be necessary to leave the single peg for more efficient 
exchange rate regimes such as the basket or the SDR pegs 
which have been proven to be superior to the single peg by 
the optimal peg literature. Most, if not all, the sterling 
area (anglophone) countries quit the single peg regime in 
favor of other arrangements. 
This begs the question of why the CFA zone (france-
phone) countries have not given up pegging their currency to 
the French franc. Is it that they are not experiencing 
problems with the peg? The answer is "no" since, as the 
newspaper reports pointed out at the beginning, these coun-
tries have been experiencing external and internal dise-
quilibria, stagnant per capita incomes and foreign debt 
problems. Given the nature of these problems, how are the 
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CFA countries responding? To answer this question, let us 
pose it in a different way. How does a country in the CFA 
zone engaged in international (multilateral) trade adjust to 
internal and external disequilibria when, because of insti-
tutional constraints, it can't carry out its own monetary 
policy nor exchange rate policy? This is the predicament of 
the CFA countries. 
In what follows, it will first be argued that the prob-
lems encountered by these countries can be traced partially 
to the institutional arrangement in which they have chosen 
to operate. Then it is argued that this choice leaves them 
with a poor adjustment mechanism. Basically, these problems 
are due to rigidities within the union and to a lack of fis-
cal and monetary discipline in some countries even though 
the latter are the vaunted advantages of pegging. 
For the CFA franc zone to function properly, so as to 
maintain the external convertibility of the CFA franc, the 
zone is most concerned with its overall balance of payments 
situation. Its policies are therefore designed to attain 
external balance. The ef{ect is that if, for instance, 
there is a balance of payments deficit in a country, the 
mechanisms of the operations account are, in principle, sup-
posed to go into effect and slow down the growth rate of the 
money supply and thus aggregate demand. In practice, there 
are violations of the requirements of the mechanism. The 
biggest such violation is the failure of the fiscal authori~ 
ties to limit their borrowing from the regional central 
banks (i.e., printing money) to no more than 20% of their 
tax revenues of the previous fiscal year as required by the 
statutes of the operations account. This violation of the 
institutional check on the growth of domestic money is due 
to the share size and power of the public sector in these 
countries. Its net effect is that rather than decreasing 
domestic demand, it increases it and contrib~tes to the 
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deficit. A point to note is that the public sector in these 
countries is also the biggest employer. In most of them, 
the operating budget (i.e., the recurrent budget for civil 
servants) is often one of the largest components of the pub-
lie budget. An implication of this is that when the CFA 
franc is overvalued (as the IMF and the World bank think it 
is), this large consuming public sector (the so-called 
elite) tend to spend on imported luxury consumer goods now 
made artificially cheaper by the overvaluation. This has 
serious economic consequences for these economies as will be 
shown later. 
Vall~e (1989) points out: 
C'est d'autant plus facile que le secteur public 
peut se financer aupres de la banque centrale, en 
~tant comptabilis~ dans la rubrique "Entreprises 
priv~es." Par ce biais, la politique mon~taire ne 
vient-pas restreindre le d~ficit budg~taire, mais 
au contraire autorise son accroissement- ••• 
(p. 132). ' 
Or, 
It is very easy for the fiscal authorities to bor-
row from the central bank and be entered as 
"Private Enterprises" in the central bank's 
accounts. By this means, monetary policy does not 
really succeed in limiting the financing of the 
budget deficit, but instead contributes to its 
growth ... (my translation). 
Coupled with the fixed peg, this is a home-made pre-
scription for economic woes for the CFA countries of the 
kinds they are going through right now. As we shall see, 
the institutional structure which guarantees the fixed 
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CFA/French franc parity deprives them of an adjustment mech-
anism and can also be a direct cause of their problems. The 
value of economic theo!y lies in the fact,that it allows us 
to understand and to explain the causes and effects of phe-
nomena. Knowing the cause~, if the effects are undesirable, 
steps can be taken to avoid them. Such steps call for new 
measures by po,licy makers. ·The CFA zone countries are expe-
riencing the problems they are going through right now 
because of the consequences of their policy choice and 
because of what can be termed a "crippling policy inelastic-
ity" (my own term) which I define as an inability or a very 
slow response to problems when you know the cause of those 
problems, can do something about it, and yet for some rea-
son, you keep vacillating and procrastinating, thus com-
pounding_your problems. 
Policy Choice and current Problems of 
the CFA Zone: Economic Analysis 
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To what extent can the current problems of the CFA 
countries be traced to their choice of exchange rate regime? 
This question can be addressed from two angles: 
1. by analyzing the Zone as a fixed exchange rate 
arrangement and demonstrating the relationship 
between the Zone's problems and their choice of 
exchange rate regime; and/or 
2. by analyzing the Zone in the context of a monetary 
union to determine to what extent it is succeeding 
as a monetary union. 
The first part of the issue can be addressed by using a 
simple model of an open small economy (Alexander, 1952; 
Johnson, 1958). In this model, it is assumed that domestic 
saving depends positively on the level of income while 
investment spending is exogenous. Therefore domestic 
macroeconomic equilibrium occurs when investment (injection) 
equals savings (leakage). When the economy is open to 
international trade, it is assumed that imports from abroad 
depend positively on income while exports abroad are exoge-
nous. In this open economy, imports (like savings) are a 
leakage of expenditures from the local economy while exports 
(like investments) are an injection of spending into the 
local economy. The condition for equilibrium income under 
these circumstances is that total leakages equal total 
injections; thus there will be internal and external bal-
ance. 
Given the relationship between savings and income (the 
marginal propensity to save), and the relationship between 
imports and income (the marginal propensity to import), 
changes in investment spending, exports and government 
expenditures will set off a chain reaction in the local 
economy that results in greater levels of spending so that 
income increases by some multiple of the changes in spend-
ing. This is called the multiplier effect of changes in 
spending. 
Implications of the Foreign Trade Multiplier 
for Commitmen~ by Authorities in 
CFA Countries to Maintain 
a Fixed Exchange Rate 
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Starting from equilibrium, let us say foreigners 
increase their purchases of coffee andjor cocoa from a (CFA) 
country. If nothing else changes, this will lead to a net 
surplus in the trade account. But what if starting from 
equilibrium, there is an exogenous increase in spending (by 
local businesses, consumers or government)? What effect 
will this have on the trade balance? Through the multiplier 
effect, domestic income will rise by more than the change in 
spending. This increase 1n income will stimulate imports 
since imports depend on income (i.e., there is a marginal 
propensity to import). The direct result will be a trade 
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deficit. In contrast to the previous situation in which the 
increase in income was export-led, it can be seen that an 
exogenous increase in domestic spending will increase domes-
tic income but this will lead to a balance of payments 
deficit assuming a small country and thus an insignificant 
role for the capital account and the foreign repercussions 
effect. 
Adjustment to Balance of Payments 
Disequilibrium 
If there is a balance of payments deficit and the coun-
try is committed to the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate 
(as is the case in the franc zone}, and to the maintenance 
of the union's overall balance of payments objectives (as is 
the case in the West and Central African Monetary unions), 
the above simple Keynesian model of an open economy suggests 
that there will be a conflict between the domestic (i.e., 
full employment} objectives of a CFA zone country and its 
commitment to the union's objectives. The main problem with 
the franc zone arrangement is that under a system of fixed 
exchange rates, and given the union's commitment to a fixed 
exchange rate and to maintenance of external balance for the 
whole group, adjustments to external disequilibrium tend to 
be automatic. To function smoothly and efficiently, the 
adjustment mechanism requires that each country forgo the 
use of monetary policy to pursue full employment objectives. 
Each country must therefore be willing to accept deflation 
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or inflation if the union's balance of payments situation 
requires it. Therein lies the predicament of the CFA coun-
tries; for if a country is experiencing a balance of pay-
ments deficit, for income adjustment to reverse the deficit, 
the authorities must allow a reduction in domestic income by 
' ' 
not undertaking policies to offset its decline. This tanta-
mounts to an-abdication of monetary policy. In today's 
world where unemployment tends to be the rule rather than 
the exception, giving up the use of monetary policy in this 
way and the use of the exchange rate which is fixed, means 
that each CFA country makes internal sacrifices for the sake 
of attaining the union's desire for external equilibrium. 
Otherwise, there is increased exchange control which tends 
to be undermined by underground exchange markets and smug-
gling of goods, both of which distort efficiency within the 
economy, and lower the tax base of the economy. The govern-
ment deficit qonsequently increases due to a shortfall in 
revenues. It is likely that this deficit will flow into the 
external deficit calling for more restrictions for the 
union's sake, and putting the countries in a vicious circle. 
Incentives To Cheat 
As is to be expected, when the objectives of the indi-
vidual (such as a CFA country) is in conflict with the 
objectives of the group (such as the union), there is an 
incentive to beat the system. In the case of the monetary 
unions, as demonstrated by an earlier passage from Vallee, 
26 
to avoid the discipline required to maintain union external 
balance through monetary control, the countries avoid such 
control by creative accounting practices in the books of the 
central banks. This tendency to scale credit limits imposed 
by union central banks can be attributed to the restrictive 
or conservative posture of the banks in credit matters. 
Here is how a·cameroonian ci~itic (Br~no Bekolo-Ebe) of the 
functioning of the monetary unions and the franc zone sees 
it (Vallee, 1989): 
The management of the currency in this area is 
based on the gold principle though the currency is 
backed almost entirely by foreign exchange 
receipts rather than by gold. It is thus a vic-
tory of the Currency School (which believes in 
money being fully backed by the amount of specie) 
over the Banking School (which holds that money 
should be sensitive to economic activity and which 
today finds expression in the willingness to use 
the power of money creation to respond to the com-
mercial and productive needs of the economy. The 
(union's) commitment and the rigor with which it 
seeks external equilibrium is matched by an equal 
fervor and rigor in managing credit. Monetary 
practices in matters of credit reflect the quan-
tity theory (especially the link between the money 
stock and the price level),, and the neutrality of 
money. Credit policy under such circumstances is 
such that the contr1but_ion of the banking system 
to the economy is reduced to that of satisfying 
its transaction needs. Thus the monetary system's 
activities are restricted to that of discounting 
short term assets linked to financing agricultural 
campaigns, and associated advances to banks. 
Medium term credit is in the range of 20% to 30% 
of union central bank assets while long term 
credit is virtually non-existent. The nonbank 
financial institutions are characterized by an 
inability to adapt to the credit- needs of the 
economies by their failure to harness domestic 
savings and use them in a manner that would be 
more responsive to the needs of the economy than 
the banks which are always worrying about credit 
risk (p. 152) (my translation) . 
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With such rigidity, it is not surprizing that national 
governments, faced with the need to promote development and 
macroeconomic objectives, seek creative ways of scaling the 
obstacles erected by union membership. This inevitably 
leads to government deficits that far exceed the maximum 
considered safe (20% of previous year's tax revenues) for 
attaining the external constraint of the union. These fis-
cal deficits get reflected in the trade account deficits in 
the manner described in the open economy model above. With-
out a viable monetary tool ~nd without an exchange rate tool 
to use for adj~stment to the trade deficit, these countries 
are censured for "unruly" behavior, told to cut back their 
government spending (i.e., reduce their deficit), and 
tighter credit measures are undertaken. This leads them 
from solving one problem (external imbalance) to inheriting 
another (internal imbalance). In the theory of economic 
policy, it is said that successful economic policy requires 
one tool for one economic problem. In the case of the CFA 
zone, the institutional constraint on the countries leaves 
each one with only fiscal policy to be used in addressing 
the two problems o~ internal and external balance. For 
these countries, it is a no-win situation. Most suffer from 
high unemployment rates coupled with persistent external 
', 
deficits. In such a situat.ion 1 the policy recommendation is 
that, to the extent that such unemployment is due to demand 
factors, expenditure-switching and expenditure-changing 
tools can be used in a complementary fashion so that the two 
goals of external and internal balance need not be in con~ 
flict. Thus a trade deficit/unemployment problem can be 
handled with devaluation to switch demand to domestic goods 
and expansionary fiscal andfor monetary policy to reduce 
unemployment, if need be. 
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This presupposes the availability and unrestricted use 
of fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate tools; i.e., autonomy 
in the use of these tools. As has already been shown, of 
these policy tools, the CFA countries can only use fiscal 
policy albeit to a limited degree within the context of the 
union. This means recurrent problems of adjustment will 
continue to plague and threaten the stability of the franc 
zone in its present structure. 
There is also doubt about the usefulness of the franc 
zone in France. According to Vallee {1989), there is a 
debate in France on the desirability of the CFA zone to 
France. Followers of the (Raymond) "Cartier doctrine" see 
the aid and budgetary subsidies that are dished out by 
France to maintain the zone as yielding no return. To them, 
the zone is nothing more than "an imperial arrangement that 
has outlived its usefulness." By contrast, others like 
Xavier de Fourni~re, se~ the.zone as "a source of wealth" (a 
bullionist view) for France. 
In the zone itself, a clear in~ication that there is 
dissatisfaction with the zone's structure and constraints is 
given in a 1984 report of the Cameroonian Economic and 
Social Council. Referring to the problems encountered by 
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membership in the zone, the report complains about the tight 
credit ceilings placed by the zone central bank and the ten-
dency to lower them. 
The report calls for decentralization of the control of 
credit, more consideration for personal collateral and 
viable business projects. Also the bank should actively 
promote short term loans to the economy. The report claims 
that these are all aspects that are neglected by the 
expatriate-?wned banks which tend to grant loans to politi-
cians or to branches of multinational corporations. In 
short, the shortcoming of the union central banks, and thus 
a weakness of the zone, is that they do not respond to the 
true development needs of the economies of its member coun-
tries. The issues raised in this report are strikingly sim-
ilar to those raised by the sterling countries. 
Apart from the fixed exchange rate issue, another way 
to examine the CFA zone is to look at how it has succeeded 
as a true monetary union. The zone is a common currency 
area which by definition (Rivera-Batiz, 1985) is a monetary 
union in which member countries adopt a common currency 
while monetary policy is under the control of a joint agency 
or bank which coordinates policy. 
If a currency area works well, the microeconomic and 
macroeconomic advantages can be considerable. Johnson 
(1969} makes the following points: 
1. maximize the objective of attaining price stabil-
ity, full employment, growth and balance of pay-
ments equilibrium; 
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2. reduce the risk of destabilizing currency specula-
tion by completely eliminating the possibility of 
exchange rate changes within the area; 
3. lower the probability of a breakdown of the inter-
national monetary system and the resulting return 
to barter and bilateral trading; 
4. impose a discipline on government policy to 
restore internal and external balance in the 
absence of automatic adjustment; 
5. make easier economic calculations by consumers and 
producers and thus promote exchange through compe-
tition; 
6. promote the integration of the economies; and 
7. permit maximum pospible freedom of transactions 
and allow exploitation of economies of scale, spe-
cialization and division of labor, thus promoting 
economic efficiency and growth. 
For these advantages to become reality, however, cer-
tain conditions (some of them stringent) have to be met. 
The first requirement is that of perfect factor mobility. 
Mundell's theory stressed this condition as a substitute for 
exchange rate changes and viewed it as conducive to a common 
currency (i.e., fixed exchange rate) area. Examined from 
the point of view of factor mobility, it is doubtful if the 
CFA zone satisfies this assumption since there are many 
institutional obstacles to allow perfect factor mobility. 
The existence of immigration offices in most of these coun-
tries is an indication that there is a policy which is 
designed to prevent the free movement of labor. 
31 
Most of these countries also place restrictions on the 
amount of funds that can be taken out of the country, thus 
suggesting that there is not much freedom of capital move-
ment either. The exceptions are usually the multinationals 
whose actions within the zone have led Ossa and Lapiquonne 
to accuse the governments of the zone members of fiscal lax-
ity. By this they mean the tendency of these governments to 
grant generous tax concessions to attract multinationals 
which then use them to manipulate and pit the countries 
against each other to compete for investment funds. The 
problem with such behavior of the multinationals is that the 
distribution of investment funds in the zone might be the 
result of distortional fiscal policies rather than reflect-
ing the real rate of return on investment in a particular 
country. 
Natural and cultural factors also constitute barriers 
to the free movement of labor. Such immobility of labor can 
be due to psychic attachment of labor to their customary 
area of residence. Hence the sentimental value (i.e., psy-
chic income) outweighs the returns from moving to another 
country or region where the wage rate and income might be 
higher. 
Another factor casting doubt on the proper functioning 
of the CFA zone as a monetary union (Rivera-Batiz, 1985) is 
that when countries join under a single monetary authority 
(such as the union central banks): 
Complications might arise regarding the financing 
of fiscal deficits. The usual interaction between 
the country's central bank and treasury in the 
financing,of government activities .would haye to 
be subordinated to the"jurisdiction of the cur-
rency area's monetary authorities, something that 
might be objectionable to domestic policy makers 
(p. 545). . . . 
This means that ,the countries involved must have some 
common politic~l interests, a willingness to adopt fiscal 
and monetary policies that are consistent with those of the 
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other countries in the union·or both. This implies similar-
ity of political,and economic interests. It is doubtful 
whether these interests,converge for the various CFA coun-
tries. The economic philosophies of these countries vary 
considerably, ranging from the "market economy" of the Ivory 
Coast, the "planned liberalism" of Cameroon, to the 
"Marxist" philosophy of the Congo. 
Not only that, as Vallee pointed out, the subordination 
of fiscal and monetary policies to the' jurisdiction of the 
union central banks exists only on paper. In'practice, 
there is hidden insubordination to meet·national priorities 
which are as divergent as the countries themselves. This 
insubordination can be traced to a violation of another 
assumption of the optimal currency area theory; i.e., that a 
currency area is justifiable for countries with similar 
national propensities to inflation. General agreement on 
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the required level of unemployment may produce different 
rates of inflation among the countries given the differing 
nature of the Phillips curve from country to country, assum-
ing such curves exist. Alternatively, the acceptable rate of 
inflation may be accomplished at the expense of varying lev-
els of unemployment among countries and varying welfare 
costs. 
The trade-off between inflation and unempl?yment pre-
sents governments with a policy choice. A,t any point in 
time, each government will have a preference, for a particu-
lar combination of inflation and unemployment which will be 
determined in reference to the country's payments position 
and the trade-off between the two. If countries differ in 
their propensities to inflat~, the currency area cannot 
function smoothly because the resulting differences in 
inflation rates will result in balance of payments difficul-
ties, necessitating exchange rate changes for correction. 
The CFA countries have development plans with different 
growth rate targets. These require different policy mixes 
which imply different inflation rates. From this point of 
view, it can hardly .be said that the CFA zone is a true mon-
etary union. 
In practical terms, the problem of achieving a true 
monetary union can be illustrated by the European Monetary 
Union and the defunct East African currency area. In the 
former, one finds that there has been great caution by 
interested parties in getting involved. The progress 
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towards monetary union in Europe has been hindered or slowed 
down by the lengthy negotiations necessary to resolve the 
conflicts that are inevitable in such a union. By contrast, 
in the CFA zone, not only was the union eased into from a 
basically colonial structure, but also the conflicts and 
real problems of forming a true monetary union were either 
not carefully considered, or everyone has learnt to live 
with the consequences and inconveniences of its operation. 
But given today's international monetary system, grinning 
and bearing it has had its painful side which is now surfac-
ing as evidenced by the newspaper reports cited ~arlier. 
The CFA countries are now seeking a way out of their prob-
lems. This calls for them to take a serious look at the 
modus operandi of the franc zone and to recognize that in a 
union of unequals (France as opposed to the CFA countries) , 
the outcome is bound to be in favor of the member with the 
stronger decision-making power. The institutional structure 
of the zone through its operations account gives France veto 
powers over money creation and exchange rate policy. It 
comes as no surprise therefore when Vallee, in referring to 
the need for reforms in the zone, talks about "the crisis of 
franco-African cooperation, manifested by fears of neocolo-
nialism on the African side, criticism of the conformity 
imposed by the rules of the zone, threats of and eventual 
withdrawal of Mali, Mauritania and Madagascar ... "from the 
zone (Vallee, 1989). 
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A Cameroonian critique of the zone is reported (Vallee, 
1989) as indicating that the exchange rate of the CFA franc 
does not reflect the real socioeconomic position of the 
countries, an~ is just another facet of the French franc 
circulating in the zone. The difficulties of the countries 
are attributed to dissimilarities of the economies, but also 
to the dominance of the French economy on these economies. 
The upshot of all this is to show that a monetary 
union's stability depends on the similarities of the mem-
bers' economies and how these affect the convergence of 
policies, and the extent to which the members are affected 
by the dominance of one member or a subgroup of them and how 
the other members relate to such dominance. If such domi-
nance is viewed as exploitative, or leaving no room for 
individual maneuver, the uni~n's survival will be shaky. If 
there are dissimilar and irreconcilable characteristics 
among the members, the union will disintegrate as was the 
case for the East African Currency area. As for the CFA 
countries, the evidence indicates that there are dissimilar-
ities, some irreconcilable differences and dominance. The 
conclusion to draw from this is that unless there are radi-
cal reforms allowing members more room for maneuver in mone-
tary and exchange rate policy, the CFA countries face 
increasing crises and the prospect of disintegration because 
the modus operandi of the zone is out of synch with condi-
tions in the present international monetary system. Short 
of disintegration or appropriate adjustment to their prob-
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lems, the union can only be maintained if France is willing 
to subsidize the financial inefficiencies of the zone. But 
then the subsidies will imply economic, monetary, commercial 
and financial opportunity costs to the CFA countries. 
Background 
Zone Membership as an Impediment to 
Econo~ic'Adjustment by 
CFA countries 
Before exa~ining the adjustment problem of the CFA 
countries, it is instructive to trace the root cause of the 
tendency of these countries to encounter persistent trade 
deficits. Since independence, the CFA countries, like most 
developing countries, have pursued a policy of industrial-
ization through import~substitution; export-promotion has 
been deemphasized because of the feeling that primary prod-
ucts have a low demand and supply elasticity. Import-sub-
stitution was viewed as a two-edged sword to achieve indus-
trialization, and savings on foreign exchange (as hitherto 
imported goods are produced locally). 
The direct result of relying on the import-substitution 
strategy was the adoption of policies that turned out to be 
counterproductive in terms of the trade balance. To begin 
with, the strategy usually starts with the erection of trade 
barriers such as tariffs, quotas and licences on the impor-
tation of certain goods. Then an import-competing industry 
is set up. This strategy results in a preference for dis-
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placing imports to save foreign exchange rather than promot-
ing exports to earn it; reliance on administrative controls 
rather than market forces to determine the allocation of 
resources; and favoring manufacturing industry at the 
expense of agriculture (Ranis & Cohen, 1971). 
Generally speaking, import-substitution has been an 
unsuccessful strategy for several reasons {Todaro, 1977): 
1. the main beneficiaries of this strategy have been 
the foreign firms (liberal tax incentives and 
repatriation of profits) ; 
2. heavy government subsidization of imports of capi-
tal goods and of intermediate products, leading to 
capital-intensive industries being set up; these 
in turn raise the requirements in terms of 
imported capital and intermediate products and 
thus more foreign exchange demanded. 
3. overvalued exchange rates which raise export 
prices in te+ms of foreign currency while lowering 
import prices in terms of domestic currency. In 
the context of import-substitution strategy, over-
valued exchange rates encourage capital-intensive 
production methods still further because the price 
of imported capital goods is artificially lowered. 
At the same time, it penalizes the traditional 
primary commodity sector by artificially raising 
the price of these exportables in terms of foreign 
currencies. This makes local farmers to be less 
competitive in world markets and deteriorates the 
balance of payments through the current account. 
In short, import-substitution: 
1. placed undue emphasis on consumer goods (i.e., 
import competing industries) in most countries; 
2. gave insufficient attention to potential long run 
comparative advantage through resource endowments 
in agriculture; and 
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3. employed alien and unsuitable capital-intensive 
technologies unnecessarily; led to the creation of 
an inefficient industrial sector operating below 
capacity, creating very little employment, very 
lit~le foieign exchange savings, and little 
prospect for further productivity growth. 
This policy has combined with structural rigidities and 
social and insti tutiorial cons'traints to make balance of pay-
ments problems, debt ~roblems, and macroeconomic problems a 
recurrent burden on the devel()ping countries, including the 
CFA countries. The point of the background just given is to 
draw attention to the drawbacks of an import-substitution 
strategy and to bring to the forefront the potential of an 
export promotion strategy. This policy recognizes the con-
straint imposed by the inability to expand exports fast 
enough to meet imports thus contributing to external imbal-
ance. It looks at the measures that can be taken to favor 
exports. Since the CFA countries are facing disequilibria, 
it asks the questions, "How can they adjust?" and more 
important in terms of this study, "Can they adjust?" 
How Can CFA Countries Adjust? 
This question can be answered by considering the pro-
cess of balance of payments adjustment, given a disequilib-
rium such as the trade deficits of the CFA countries. 
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Faced with a deficit, the CFA countries can finance it 
out of their international reserves or by attracting invest-
ment from their trading partners. However, their capacity 
to cover a trade deficit is limited by their stocks of 
international reserves and by the willingness of their trad-
ing partners to invest in these countries. 
To adjust to disequilibrium, the CFA countries can: 
1. allow automatic adjustment mechanisms to reestab-
lish equilibrium; 
a. fully flexible exchange rates: this policy 
allows the free market to determine exchange 
rates so that a trade deficit can be removed 
through depreciation of the CFA franc. Its 
effect would be to reduce imports and the 
demand for foreign exchange and increase 
exports and the supply of foreign exchange. 
b. automatic adjustment mechanism under a fixed 
exchange rate: since the exchange rate is 
fixed, adjustment by the CFA countries to a 
trade deficit calls for selling foreign ex-
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change from their stock of international 
reserves. This is only a short-term solu-
tion, given the limited availability of for-
eign exchange. Nonetheless, the sale of for-
eign currency, if not sterilized or if only 
partially sterilized, reduces the money sup-
ply. Assuming the quantity theory holds, the 
decrease in the money supply reduces the 
price level. The lower price level then 
works through relative prices to remove the 
trade deficit as the lower price in the CFA 
countries makes their exportables more com-
petitive and attractive to both foreign and 
domestic consumers. This is the so-called 
price-specie flow mechanism first expounded 
by Hume. 
Also, as the money supply falls, aggregate demand 
falls, income falls, and reduces income-induced imports, 
thus improving the trade balance. This is the Keynesian 
adjustment mechanism. 
The third possibility (whose effect might not be so 
significant in the, CFA countries as in any other developing 
country) is the asset market mechanism. A reduction in the 
money supply, as foreign exchange is sold in response to an 
excess demand for foreign exchange du~ to a trade deficit, 
raises the interest rate. Domestic financial assets become 
an attractive alternative of investment to foreigners and 
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domestic (CFA) citizens. The effect is to improve the capi-
tal account and thus the balance of payments. 
The conclusion is that under a fixed exchange rate, the 
adjustment to a trade deficit occurs automatically through 
the monetary mechanism. However, the removal of the trade 
deficit results in lower real income and employment. Thus 
the price of attaining external balance is internal imbal-
ance. Fiscal policy cannot be counted on in this situation 
to remove the internal imbalance. This is because an expan-
sionary fiscal policy will raise income and imports, deteri-
orating the trade account. Besides, if the policy is insti-
tuted near full employment, its inflationary effects will 
make CFA exportables less competitive, further deteriorating 
the trade account. Thus fiscal policy cannot be used to 
offset the automatic monetary m~chanism without getting the 
CFA countries back to external imbalance. 
2. Discretionary Policy to Restore Equilibrium: 
Rather than relying on the automatic monetary 
adjustment Iflechanism, the CFA countries can influ-
ence economic transactions with foreigners through 
exchange rate management. Under a fixed exchange 
rate, currency devaluation can be used to remove a 
trade deficit. The effect of devaluation is to 
raise the price of imports in terms of domestic 
currency, reducing the demand for imports and for-
eign exchange. It also decreases the price of 
exports in terms of foreign currency, increasing 
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the demand for exports and the supply of foreign 
exchange. Devaluation thus removes a trade 
deficit by switching foreign and domestic expendi-
tures to the domestic {CFA) economies through its 
effects on relative prices. 
As net exports increase following the devaluation, 
aggregate demand increases and income and employment 
increase if there are idle resources. But if devaluation 
occurs when the CFA economies are near full employment or 
bottlenecks in the economies make production to lag behind 
demand, then prices will rise. The resulting inflation will 
offset the effects of devaluation through loss of interna-
tional competitiveness by the CFA countries. This suggests 
that devaluation by itself may not be enough to attain 
external balance. Thus to prevent domestic inflation from 
eroding the gain in competitiveness due to devaluation, it 
might be necessary to combine it with deflationary policy. 
The above arguments can be demonstrated with a simple 
algebraic model found in most international economics text-
books (i.e., see Chapter 5 in Rivera-Batiz, 1985). 
X-M = Y-A 
where 
X = exports 
M imports 
y = income (production) 
A = absorption (aggregate expenditures) 
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The equation says the current account is the difference 
between domestic production (income) and absorption 
(aggregate expenditures). If the demand for tradables is 
sufficiently elastic, devaluation reduces the trade deficit 
by increasing income relative to absorption. Income 
increases because of the effect of an increase in net 
exports on aggregate demand aQd_ output. As income 
increases, absortion increases but the net effect is a 
reduction in the trade deficit. Now, if income is fixed 
(i.e., Y = Y), the,above equation shows that absorption must 
fall if the trade deficit is to be reduced. Devaluation 
itself reduces absorption through its effect on consumption 
expenditures (on imports). But it may need to be reinforced 
with a reduction in government spending andjor money supply. 
How Economic Adjustment is Hindered by 
Certain Institutional Constraints 
in the CFA Countries 
We have answered the· question of how adjustment to a 
trade deficit in the CFA countries can take place under a 
fixed exchange rate. We now look at how economic adjustment 
to a trade deficit is impeded by certain institutional fea-
tures of the CFA zone. 
To begin with, we observe that in the present interna-
tional monetary system, temporary trade deficits are 
financed but persistent trade deficits, like those currently 
faced by the CFA countries, call for adjustment (Table II). 
Country 
TABLE II 
TRADE DEFICITS OF SOME CFA COUNTRIES 
(IN MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
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cameroon -481 -397 -417 -183 -586 -567 -893 na 
Ivory Coast -141 -102 -931 -580 -640 -138 -951 -110 
Senegal -462 -267 -289 -274 -322 -271 -257 -268 
CAR -400 -490 -290 -340 -480 -870 na na 
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics: various issues 
na = not available 
Table II shows that trade deficits are persistent. Thus 
adjustment, rather. than financing, is called for. 
Newspaper reports, especially in Jeune Afrique and the 
Economist, have made frequent references to meetings and 
talks within CFA circles to discuss the feasibility of 
devaluation of the CFA franc contemplated by some CFA coun-
tries (Ivory coast, Senegal, Cameroon) and recommended as 
part of a structural adjustment package by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) which considers the CFA franc overval-
ued. An overvalued currency works to hurt the international 
competitiveness of the CFA countries in real terms. The 
international competitiveness of the CFA countries can be 
expressed in terms of the real exchange rate. This is a 
price-adjusted exchange rate. The real exchange rate is the 
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nominal exchange rate times the ratio of the foreign price 
level to the domestic price level of the CFA countries. Let 
where 
Er = the real exchange rate 
Edf = the CFA franc price of foreign currency 
pf 
= the foreign price level 
pd 
= the price level in the CFA zone. 
The real exchange rate expresses the prices of foreign 
goods and CFA goods in CFA francs. A rise in the real 
exchange rate, as defined above, means the CFA countries are 
more competitive relative to the foreign country and vice 
versa. If interest lies in .the competitiveness of the CFA 
countries relative to more than one trading partner, a real 
effective exchange rate is used. This is the nominal effec-
tive exchange rate times an .. appropriate price index for the 
trading partners and divided by the price index for the CFA 
countries (see Table III). 
A persistent trade deficit for the CFA zone implies an 
overvalued exchange rate for the CFA franc. Alternatively, 
an overvalued CFA franc is a source of persistent trade 
deficits. This is because foreign goods are made cheaper 
than domestic goods. In other words, the CFA countries lose 
international competitiveness. This is why structural 
adjustment to persistent current account deficits calls for 
real exchange rate devaluation. 
TABLE III 
REAL EXCHANGE RATES FOR SOME 
CFA COUNTRIES 
Ivory Coast Cameroon Senegal 
1970 -100.- na 100 
1971 92 na 98 
1972 88 123.85 99 
1973 92 116.90 105 
1974 93 129.52 105 
1975 95 106.25 127 
1976 96 108.43 116 
1977 109 104.28 115 
1978 113 95.07 109 
1979 120 97.61 109 
1980 124 10'0. 00 105 
1981 115 111.83 96 
1982 108 119.84 98 
1983 102 119.60 99 
1984 97 na 102 
1985 94 na 110 
1986 98 na 116 
1987 102 na 110 
Source: Vall~e (1989), p. 22i fo~ C6te d'Ivoir~ and Senegal 
na = not available 
Note: Vall~e defines the real exchange rate as 1·/Edf(Pdjpf). Thus, an 
increase is a loss in competitiveness. As can be seen, the years of 
increasing values for the rea_l ex'change rate dominate the years . of 
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decreasing values. There i~ therefore a need for adjustment policies to 
regain competitiveness. 
Given this explanation of the real exchange rate, it is 
clear that the CFA countries can increase Er {and thus gain 
international competitiyeness) ~n two ways: 
1. through an increase in Edf (i.e., through a 
devaluation of the CFA franc in nominal terltls); 
and/or 
2. through a reduction in pd (i.e., through reducing 
the domestic price level}. The latter policy 
points to a deflationary fiscal andjor monetary 
policy. 
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These two approaches to adjustment enable us to high-
light the major impediments to adjustment imposed by certain 
features of.the institutional arrangement of the CFA zone. 
The Pegging Constraint 
The currency arrangement between the CFA zone and 
France calls for maintenanc~ of a fixed p'arity through the 
operations account. Therefore the CFA countries cannot 
affect the nominal exchange rate--it is fixed and has been 
so since 1948. Thus, exchange rate policy is abdicated. 
International competitiveness cannot be gained through 
exchange rate managem~nt. 
The Monetary Union Constraint 
Due to monetary union, member countries have surren-
dered independent monetary policy to the two union central 
banks (the West African Central Bank and the Central·African 
' ' 
Central Bank). Due to the currency ties of the unions to 
the French franc through the operations account, the CFA 
franc is acceptable internationally (convertibility), since 
it can always be redeemed for French francs--a. hard cur-
rency. Therefore France is concerned with the possibility 
of overissue of CFA francs by the CFA countries. As a 
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result, the overall balance of payments situation of the two 
union central banks in the franc zone relative to non-franc 
zone countries are closely monitored to prevent the over-
issue of CFA francs. To this end, given the peg of the CFA 
franc to the French franc and the objective of overall pay-
m~ents balance for the zone,· the institutional mechanism in 
place for adjustment is akin to the automatic monetary 
adjustment mechanism. When there is an undesired overall 
deficit for a union area, statutes call for restraining 
credit to member countries. This is just another way of 
saying the money supply is reduced. Monetary policy is thus 
geared towards attaining external balance and cannot be used 
actively for domestic macroeconomic purposes. This is the 
so-called monetary discipline argument for single pegging. 
But, as Table IV shows, no such discipline exists in the CFA 
zone. 
1968-1973 
1974-1978 
1979-1981 
1982-1985 
1986 
TABLE IV 
AVERAGE YEARLY GROWTH RATES OF MONEY 
FOR SELECTED CFA COUNTRIES 
( PERC::EN.TAGES) 
Ivory Coast Mali Niger Senegal 
16.8 6.7 11.9 12.3 
31.5 24.8 28.4 24.8 
3.2 7:8 20.2 10.9 
10.1 14.5 3.5 8.4 
2.7 6.0 11.9 11.1 
Togo 
14.7 
32.5 
15.7 
9.2 
15.5 . 
Source: adapted from Vallee (1989), p. 223: BCEAO Original source 
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Besides the monetary indiscipline problem, the CFA countries 
have not been successful in containing inflation so that the 
pd term in the real exchange rate above can fall. on the 
contrary, there has been domestic inflation in all CFA coun-
tries which only appreciates the real exchange rate and 
overvalues the CFA franc in real terms. This impairs compe-
tition and worsens the trade balance and balance of payments 
(see Table V) . 
TABLE'V 
YEARLY GROWTH RATES OF INFLATION IN 
SOME CFA COUNTRIES 
Cameroon CAR Ivory Coast Senegal 
1971 4.1 8.7 -1.5 3.9 
1972 8.2 7.2 0.3 6.3 
1973 10.2 5.6 11.0 11.1 
1974 17.2 9.7 17.5 16.6 
1975 13.6 15.9 11.5 31.8 
1976 10.0 10.6 11.8 11.6 
1977 14.6 9.7 27.5 11.4 
1978 12.5 11.6 13.0 3.3 
1979 6.5 9.5 16.6 9.8 
1980 9.9 17.1 14.7 8.7 
1981 10.6 12.6 8.8 5.9 
1982 12.3 13.2 7.3 17.3 
1983 16.8 13.3 5.9 11.7 
1984 11.3 12.0 4.3 12.2 
1985 3.1 11.0 1.8 13.3 
1986 3.0 8.8 5.8 10.5 
source: Adapted from Vallee (1989), p. 214 
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What emerges from Table V is that the CFA countries are 
prone to inflation, a contributory factor to loss of inter-
national competitiveness (i.e., an overvalued exchange rate 
in real terms) . 
The Fiscal Policy Constraint 
The CFA zone compels the member countries to abdicate 
monetary and exchange rate management. Thus they are left 
with only fiscal policy to be used to address the objectives 
of internal and external balance. However, besides the the-
oretical limits associated with using one tool (fiscal 
policy) to address two objectives (internal and external 
balance), the statutes of the CFA zone limit each country's 
government borrowing to no more than 20 percent of its fis-
cal receipts for the previous year. Apparently, this mea-
sure is intended to avoid large public sector deficits which 
can easily flow into current account deficits, given the 
fixed exchange rate. This fiscal constraint, coupled with 
the abdication of monetary and exchange rate management, 
severely limits the ability of the CFA countries to adjust 
to economic problems. 
The Commercial Policy Constraint 
They are therefore left with only commercial policy as 
a significant tool of adjustment. Since they cannot 
devalue, they have to resort to exchange control by 
restricting imports and/or subsidizing exports. The result 
51 
can be more inflation and loss of international competitive-
ness because import restrictions create shortages and export 
subsidies increase domestic aggregate demand through an 
increase in exports, however large or small. Import short-
ages lead to black markets and smuggling calling for more 
control. As these activities erode the tax base, the gov-
ernments are faced with revenue shortfalls which lead to 
higher deficits and a worsening balance of payments, which 
calls for devaluation (impeded by zone constraints). Thus, 
still more control is called for--and the CFA countries find 
themselves in a vicious circle. 
As the above analysis has shown, the current economic 
problems of the CFA countries have to do with the particular 
features of the institutional structure which they have set 
up to achieve monetary union and to peg and maintain a fixed 
exchange rate. The conclusion to draw is that economic 
adjustment in the CFA countries could be made easier by the 
availability and unrestricted use of monetary, exchange rate 
and fiscal tools--arid less·exchange control (i.e., trade 
liberalization) . 
CHAPTER II 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
Objective of study 
The contemporary international monetary system is 
characterized by the float of the major currencies either 
freely or in a managed fashion~ When it comes to the cur-
rencies of the developing countries, other arrangements 
prevail. For example, the CFA franc is pegged to the 
French franc. This pegging places several constraints, two 
of which are the subject matter of 'this dissertation. The 
first objective of thjs study is to investigate whether the 
French monetary authorities, operating through the European 
Monetary System (EMS) and,the international financial mar-
kets, have been successful, in stabilizing the value of the 
French franc on the foreign·exchange market. This issue is 
of particular interest to the CFA countries beqause any 
instability of the French franc will be transmitted to the 
CFA franc through the fixed peg. If such instability 
exists, it is worthwhile to investigate whether the indi-
rect connection of the CFA franc to,the other major curren-
cies, through the French franc, has impacted significantly 
on trade flows between the CFA countries and these coun-
tries. This is the second objective of this study. In 
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order to tackle these issues, a framework for analyzing the 
activities of the French authorities in the foreign 
exchange market is presented (Appendix) . This can be 
referred to as joint floating, where changes in the value 
of the French franc are transmitted to the CFA franc. 
Then, a framework for studying the effects of the single 
peg regime on trade !lows is presented. This can be 
referred to as the trade effects, encompassing the real 
effects on trade flows resulting from the influence of the 
French franc on the CFA franc through the peg. The study 
contributes to the literature on international trade flows 
by studying the export flows of the CFA countries during 
the era of managed float. A look at trade flows is essen-
tial because a low rate of export expansion limits the 
capacity to import investment goods. This can lead not 
only to export-constrained growth, but also to-a worsening 
trade balance and increased trade deficits and debt ser-
vice. Thus, adequate export performance is an important 
objective of economic policy for these countries. The 
export flows of the CFA countries will be assessed to 
determine if the choice of exchange rate regime and the 
behavior of the exchange rate have influenced their compet-
itive position and export performance. The effect of 
changes in their competitive position will be reflected in 
changes in their market shares. 
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Motivation and Literature Review 
The motivation for this study is the currency arrange-
ment between France and her former colonies in Africa which 
consist of: 
1. five countries in Central Africa: Cameroon, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon. 
2. six countries in West Africa: Benin, Burkina 
Fasso, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Togo, and Senegal. 
These countries belong to two monetary unions--one grouping 
the Central African States with its headquarters in Yaounde 
(Cameroon), and the other grouping the West African States 
with its headquarters in Dakar (Senegal). They use a com-
mon currency, the CFA franc, which has been pegged to the 
French franc at the rate of 50 CFA francs per French franc 
since 1948. The peg has remained unchanged despite the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed but 
adjustable rates and the advent of generalized floating. 
For developing countries with currencies tied to a major 
currency, such as the CFA franc peg to the French franc 
(FF), generalized floating means that their currency moves 
jointly and simultaneously with the FF. Thus, if the lat-
ter appreciates, the effect on the developing country will 
be to stimulate imports while discouraging exports. To 
restore balance, the CFA-franc needs to be devalued, an 
option not open due to the commitment to an unchanged peg. 
The recent experience of the CFA countries bears witness to 
these events. In 1987, West Africa Magazine (Aug 3, 1987) 
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reported that Cote d'Ivoire had announced it could not ser7 
vice its external debt due to a budgetary shortfall and was 
considering devaluing its currency. This had been recom-
mended by .the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. But Cote d'Ivoire could not act on its intentions 
because such a move had to be approved by other member 
states of the CFA z·one, ·and. above all by the .. French author-
ities who g~arantee the stability and convertibility of the 
CFA franc. This approval never materialized. 
In the same vein, the Financial Times of London (May 
24, 1989) reported that several of the CFA countries' 
economies are: 
Battling with balance of payments defici.ts caused 
by falling prices for their exports, the drought, 
and the heavy cost of servicing external debt and 
a host of other economic ills (p. 24). 
The same article pointed out that: 
It is an open secret in francophone banking cir-
cles that some World Bank and International Mone-
tary Fund analysts.think the CFA franc is over-
valued (p. 24) . 
A devaluation was nec·e'ssary and, indeed, had been re-
commended. But objections were raised for political rea-
sons. African politicians ~ere concerned.about·the high 
import costs a devaluation might entail and its effects on 
the cost of living in urban areas.. There were also eco-
nomic objections from French business interests. According 
to Jeune Afrique (Sept. 18, 1989): 
The convertibility of the CFA franc protects 
those French businesses and banks that do busi-
ness in the CFA zone against exchange risks 
(p. 40). 
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Single pegging as an exchange rate regime has been 
studied under the theory of optimal pegging which seeks to 
determine which of the three forms of pegging (single, bas-
ket, or SDR) is optimal in the sense of minimizing the 
variability of the real ex~hange rate., Studies by Black 
{1976), Lipchitz {1970), Lipchitz and sundararajan {1980), 
and Branson and Katseli {1980) have differed only in terms 
of what they suggest as the weig:hting scheme to be used· in 
calculating the effective exchange rate [see Williamson 
(1982) for a summary]. The main conclusion from the theo-
retical and empirical analyses of these writers is that the 
basket peg is preferable to the single peg in controlling 
real exchange rate variability and the SDR peg is best 
(Crockett and Nsouli, 1970) .,· 
The CFA-French Franc Peg in Perspective 
Apart from the real exchange rate effects of the vari-
ous pegs, the following studies have also been undertaken 
on the CFA franc as a sing~e peg. 
Garrity {1972) examined the effect of the 1969 devalu-
ation of-the French franc on the economy of Cote d'Ivoire 
and concluded that it was not beneficial because it 
occurred at a time when the econom~c situation did not call 
for a devaluation. As she points out: 
The August devaluation of the French franc was 
forced on that government {French) by a persis-
tent balance-of-payments disequilibrium which 
was, to a large extent, related to the French 
political crisis of the previous year. Although 
the Ivory Coast's internal and external situation 
did not call for such a policy, as a member of 
the franc zone her currency was also devalued by 
the same percentage ... in order to keep 
unchanged the relationship of the CFA franc to 
the French franc. Like the other members of the 
currency zone, the Ivory Coast was not consulted 
prior to this devaluation. Throughout the 1960s, 
the Ivory Coast's balance of payments was charac-
terized by large trade surpluses--the export/ 
import ratio fluctuating between 113 and 137--and 
an overall (balance of payments) surplus, except 
in 1967. Her net for~ign,assets totalled 28.2 
billion CFA francs at the end of 1969~ represent-
ing 33 percent bf the total value of imports for 
that year. Internal prices increased only moder-
ately during the period under consideration .... 
(p. 628) 
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Bourcier de Carbon (1969) points out that, because the 
single peg occurs within a monetary union, it helps main-
tain economic equilibrium and it eases the process of mod-
ernization. His argument is based on the theory of optimum 
currency areas (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963). On the 
other hand, Kouadio (1983) argues that the CFA zone is far 
from a monetary union because it lacks,the characteristics 
of a monetary union as defined by the theory of optimum 
currency areas. He claims :that the union perpetuates com-
mercial, financial and monetary'dependence. 
Alibert (1983) counters critics of the single peg by 
pointing out that they do not consider French aid to the 
CFA countries, the volume of preferential trade with them, 
and the guarantee of the CFA franc by France, which pro-
motes confidence, trade with, and investment in the zone. 
Ossa and Lapiquonne (1984), however, counter that such 
investments are only in extractive activities. Competition 
by CFA countries for foreign investments promotes fiscal 
laxity through generous fiscal provisions. The free trans-
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fer of capital and generous conditions for the repatriation 
of funds makes it easy for funds to escape taxation. Their 
conclusion is that the peg adversely affects the zone coun-
tries financially, commercially, and monetarily. They see 
in the pe,g a disarichoring of, monetary policy from the 
economies of the zone on account'of it being de facto under 
the control of France,.whose objectives and interests do 
not necessarily ,coincide with those of the Afripan coun-
tries. 
Nascimento's (1987) benefit-cost analysis of the sin-
gle, basket, and SDR pegs for the CFA countries concludes 
that the basket peg is preferab~e to the single peg. 
Macedo ( 1984) sh~ws that fqr ·,the CFA countries, even though 
' ' 
the monetary union achieved nominal effective exchange rate 
stability, this was at the expense of real effective 
exchange rate volatility which incr.eased during the recent 
flexible exchange r~te period. Finally,; Devarajan and De 
Melo (1987) examine the questipn of ,whet,her the lack of 
autonomy of the CFA union central banks and the surrender 
of the exchange rate as a policy instrument has impeded 
member countries' growth. On a comparative basis_, they 
conclude that: 
CFA countries,grew significantly faster than com-
parator sub-saharan African countries but usually 
slower ... than the whole sample of developing 
countries (p. 483). 
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Critique of the Literature 
A shortcoming of most these studies is that few, if 
any, are concerned with the demand for exports (i.e., the 
real side of trade flows). Even when they do, they are 
concerned with. the demand for exports as a whole. Espe-
cially lacking are estimates relating to pr_oducts which are 
classified by Standa!d International Trade Classification 
(SITC} categories .. Even when such estimates exist, few 
involve estimates of relevance to the African setting. The 
major weaknes~ of all the studies that have looked at trade 
flows is their tendency to apply a common elasticity figure 
to all commodity groups,· which need not necessarily be the 
case for individual SITC categories. As an example, if an 
African government wishes to know the effect of a given 
policy measure on the incomes of its coffe~ and/or cocoa 
growers, it will find direct elasticities more relevant 
than an elasticity.estimate'for primary commodity exports 
as a whole. Thus a disaggregated analysis is, for some 
purposes, preferable to an:aggregate analysis. 
This study uses a disaggregated approach by employing 
share analysis to examine the impact of exchange rate 
regime and exchange rate behavior on these shares. Share 
analysis is closely connected to elasticities of substitu-
tion, whereas most studies of developing country trade 
functions have dwelt on import demand elasticity. The con-
cern has been with "elasticity pessimism," according to 
which a devaluation of the domestic currency will not 
improve the trade balance. While aggregate elasticity 
estimates are of particular importance to LDCs, of equal 
importance is each country's share in foreign markets. 
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CHAPTER III 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN THE FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE MARKET 
The first .part of this study is concerned with whether, 
through foreign exchange market intervention, the French 
monetary authorities have been successful in stabilizing the 
value of the French franc. It is well-known that since the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 1973, countries have 
intervened in the foreign exchange market for various rea-
sons (Argy, 1982; Quirk, 1977). Such intervention involves 
the monetary authorities buying or selling foreign exchange 
to partially offset short run fluctuations in exchange rates 
(i.e., lean against the wind) for the purpose of promoting 
orderly market conditions or influencing long-term trends in 
the exchange rate. The exercise might also be intended to 
speed up exchange rate adjustments rather than rely on the 
market. 
In this part of the study, the focus is on the success 
or failure of intervention by the French authorities in sta-
bilizing the French franc. 'Of specific importance to this 
study is the pegging of the CFA franc to the French franc. 
In the current system, as the French franc floats against 
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other major currencies, suqh fluctuations are transmitted to 
the CFA franc. In other words, both currencies float 
jointly against the other major currencies. As a result, 
the CFA franc will be subject to arbitrary devaluations or 
revaluations. ,'This can have repercu~sions on: the trade 
flows of the GFA countries which are not the results of 
" 
deliberate policy., The latter issue constitutes the object 
of the second part of this study. 
To understand the ramifications of the CFA franc peg to 
the French franc', it is instructive: to look at the effect of 
the peg on the stability of the real exchange rate of the 
CFA franc and therefore on the CFA countries' ability to 
compete. In a world of floating exchange rates, the real 
effective exchange rate of the CFA franc can be defined as a 
weighted average of the bilateral real exchange rate between 
the CFA franc and·the currencies of their trading partners. 
Hence: 
E~z (1) 
where 
= the real.effective exchange rate of the CFA 
fran'c, and z stands for the CFA zone or coun-
tries 
W• = J weights which sum to one 
where 
Erj = 
p. = J 
Pz = 
Ezj 
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the real effective ~xchange rate relative to 
a particular trading partner and is defined 
as: 
Erj = Ezj (Pj /Pz ), 
the price level of trading partner j 
is the price level in .the CFA zone 
the CFA franc price o·f currency j I and can 
decomposed into the CFA franc price of the 
numeraire currency (French franc, Ezp) and 
the numeraire currency price of currency j 
(Epj ) or 
(2} 
be 
(3) 
Through substitution of (2) and (3) into (1), the lat-
ter can be written as: 
n 
L: wjErFj j=l 
j:;eF 
(4) 
where ErzF is the real exchange rate of the zone relative to 
the French franc, ErFj is the real exchange rate of the 
numeraire relative to other currencies j. 
Equation (4) shows that real exchange rate changes of 
the CFA franc are composed of two parts: one arising from 
changes with the numeraire country (France), and the other 
from changes between the French franc and other currencies. 
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Thus, even if pegging to the French franc eliminates one 
source of disturbance (the first expression on the right 
hand side) , changes between the French franc and other cur-
rencies will affect the real exchange rate of the CFA franc. 
It is thus.clear why the CFA countries would be interested 
in the stability of the iren,ch, rranc internationally. 
In order to investigate thi~ question, a simultaneous 
\ ' ' ' I 
equation model of the exchange rate, and intervention policy 
is presented~ In this model, the exchange rate depends on 
central bank intervention, and other. explanatory variables 
derived from Frankel's (1979) real interest differential 
model. Intervention is a function of exchange rate changes, 
deviations of the exchange rate' from a target rate deter-
mined by relative French and German prices(a proxy for devi-
ations from PPP), and unanticipated depreciation of the 
exchange rate (a proxy for "news"). 
PPP is used to model the desired rate, rather than as a 
theory of determination of exchange rates, an issue subject 
to enormous controversy. Argy (1982) argues that: 
The target approach' to intervention involves two 
steps: first, the determination of a target zone 
and the establishment of rules for interven,tism in 
relation to it.· The best-known proposal fqr 
determining a target exchange rate .is based on 
purchasing power parity, PPP. It suggests that 
the target be determined by trends in domestic 
prices relatjve to foreign prices, according to 
the Commission of the European Countries' OPTICA 
Report, 1976 (p. 27). 
The use of the PPP norm is further supported by Artus 
(1978) who stresses the need of countries in a managed 
floating regime for "methods of assessing the appro-
priateness of their exchange rates and for guiding their 
rate management policies." .Arguing for the use of the PPP 
norm, Artus (1978) states: 
... the asset market view of exchange rate deter-
mination is fully consistent with the large 
excha~ge rate fluctuationp observed since 1973. 
It also implies that in the.absence of active 
exchange rate management .policies, .such fluctua-
tions will continue as long as short run real and 
monetary developments in.the various countries are 
not fully.harmonized. As to the evqlution of the 
exchange rate in the longer run, howeveri the 
asset market view is fully consistent with the 
traditional view that it is essentially determined 
by the purchasing power of the currency in the · 
goods markets. The long run adjustment comes 
through arbitrage in the goods market and through 
the influenc~ of long run expectations (~. 283). 
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The Append'ix presents a mod.el which draws on Frankel's 
(1979) study and·mqdifies Genberg's '(1978) model to allow 
for the determination of the nominal exchange rate (rather 
than the real exchange rate as does Genberg), and its long 
run equilibrium va~ue (without recourse to price'indices for 
PPP purposes). 
In the model, it has been assumed that the French 
authorities pursue a policy of leaning against the wind, 
based on PPP, in order to resist exchange rate fluctuations. 
Intervention may be due to a variety of reasons which have 
been alluded to'already. But whatever the'motive, an active 
exchange rate management policy is by no means sufficient to 
ensure exchange rate stability. Active exchange rate poli-
cies can, and quite often, lead to increased exchange rate 
instability. In other words, in intervening to stabilize 
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the exchange rate of the French franc, the French authori-
ties may contribute to its instability. 
Two different intervention models are used to evaluate 
the impact of French intervention in the foreign exchange 
market. The model is presented in the Appendix. The esti-
mating equations, using the Artus method, are: 
(5) 
* It= a 0 + a 1 (Elt-Elt) + a 2 {Elt-Elt-l) 
+ a 3UDt + a 4UDt-l + € 2 {6) 
* * Elt = a0 + a 1 (Pt-Pt) + € 3 {6a) 
The estimating equations, using Argy's method, are: 
It= a 0 + a 1 (Elt-Elt-l) + a 2It-l + a 3UDt 
+ a4U0t-1 + €4 
where 
It = intervention variable 
It-l = lagged value of It 
Elt = log of the francjmark ex~hange rate [Interna-
tional Monetary Fund: Financial Statistics 
(IFS), various issues] 
(7) 
(8) 
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* E1t = log of the predicted (target) exchange rate 
E1t_1 = lag of the log of the exchange rate 
MF and MG =French and German money supplies (in log form) 
respectively, proxied by money supplies narrowly 
defined (i.e., M1 [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD): Main Eco-
nomic Indicators, various issues]) 
* Pt = log of German CPI 
Pt = log of French CPI 
* y-y = income differential (in log form), proxied by 
the industrial production index (OECD) 
r-r* = nominal interest differential using call money 
rates (IFS) 
* TI-TI =expected inflation differential, proxied by the 
long term government bond rates (OECD). The 
data are monthly and the model is estimated for 
the period January 1973 to December 1984. 
UDt = current unanticipated depreciation 
UDt_1 = lagged unanticipated depreciation (the reason 
for including UDt and UDt_1 are empirical 
(improved results) and theoretical (Dornbusch; 
Appendix) 
A priori, for the Artus method: 
a 1 <o : French authorities smooth fluctuations from a 
target level 
French authorities lean against the wind 
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cyclical and current account "news" elicits 
intervention activity 
a 4 <0 : delayed response to "news" in previous periods 
A priori for the Argy method: 
French authorities lean against the wind 
lagged effects of intervention on present 
intervention actions 
cyclical and current account "news" elicits 
intervention 
a 4 >o : delayed' effects of news on current intervention 
A priori, B1>o ; B2<o ; B3<o according to Frankel 
(though it could be positive according to the Bilson-Frankel 
(Chicago School)) hypothesis; B4>o; B 5 >o if intervention is 
to be stabilizing. If B5 is positive, it implies that an 
increase in intervention (i.e., a DM purchase through a sale 
of French francs) leads to French franc depreciation or sale 
of DM leads to FF appreciation. If B5<o, then it implies a 
destabilizing intervention policy. In this case, reserves 
are accumulated (or DMs are purchased through a sale of 
French francs) when the deustche mark is strong, thus making 
it even stronger. 
According to Quirk (1977), IMF guidelines to 
intervention recommend that, in intervening: 
.•. the member should not normally act aggres-
sively with respect to the exchange value of its 
currency i.e. should not so act as to depress that 
value when it is falling or to enhance that value 
when it is rising (p. 646). 
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In other words, authorities should not weaken a depre-
ciating currency or strengthen an appreciating currency, 
thus destabilizing the exchange rate. "Thus, B5 is not 
expected to be negative. 
These two simultaneous ~quations reflect the works of 
Frankel ( 1979) , Argy ( 1982) '· Artus ( 1978) , Quirk ( 1977) , 
Genberg {1978) and Frenkel {1978) .. Equations {6) and {8) 
reflect the usual assumption that the authorities base their 
intervention policy·on developments in the foreign exchange 
market. Hence the exchange rate and other economic consid-
erations are tBe ~xplanatory ~ariables.· Based on Ar~y 
{1982), both examine wh.ether French authorities pursued a 
policy of leaning against the wind through intervention. 
Interveption should be inversely related to the 
exchange rate in Equations {6) and {8) due to leaning 
against the wind. Thus, if we let E •' · stand for the French lJ 
franc price of the mark, wh~n the domestic currency depreci- . 
ates (E· ·rises), there is'a:decumulation of reserves as it lJ 
is bought to lower Eij; when it appreciates (Eij falls), 
there is an accumulation of reserves, as it is sold to raise 
Eij. Intervention ther'efore moves negatively with respect 
to the exchange rate. Thus if a1 is negative, it will con-
firm that a policy of leaning against the wind was being 
pursued. 
Equations (5) and (7) reflect Argy's {1982) claim that 
"causation could run the opposite way from intervention to 
the exchange rate'' (p. 69). Artus (1976) and Quirk (1977). 
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have also suggested that intervention and the exchange rate 
are jointly determined in the foreign exchange market 
through a policy of leaning against the wind. This equation 
suggests that policy actions in the market could be a source 
of instability through their effects on the exchange rate. 
The parameter of particular interest in this study is 
the coefficient of the intervention variable (B 5 ) . A pri-
ori, it is expected to be positive, indicating that a sale 
of foreign exchange (reserve decumulation) leads to 
appreciation of the French franc (i.e., intervention 
achieves its objective). If it is not, then intervention is 
destabilizing (i.e., foreign exchange is being purchased at 
a time when it should be sold). That is, the monetary 
authority intervenes "pro-cyclically" rather than "counter-
cyclically" in an attempt to influence the exchange rate. 
This can be caused by mistimed measures due to recognition, 
administrative, action and impact lags. This would rein-
force exchange rate movements rather than offsetting them, 
contrary to the recommendation of the Committee on Reform of 
the International Monetary System and Related Issues cited 
above. 
The first.of these objectives, whether intervention was 
stabilizing or destabilizing, is studied using a two equa-
tion simultaneous model of the foreign exchange market. In 
the estimation, an equation for the determination of the 
French money supply is included because it is endogenously 
determined. Intervention in the foreign exchange market by 
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the French monetary authorities (unless sterilized) will 
alter the French monetary base and thus the French money 
supply. The equations are estimated structurally using two-
stage least .squares. 
The results (Table VI), for both Artus and Argy, indi-
cate that the French authorities pursued a policy of leaning 
against the wind, as the coefficient.of the exchange rate in 
the reaction function is negative and significant. 
If foreign exchange market intervention is destabiliz-
ing, it will be reflected in.a n~gative effect of the inter-
vention variable (B5 ) on the exchange rate. Thus, a priori, 
a positive sign is hypothesized for intervention if it was 
,. 
stabilizing. Otherwise, it was destabilizing. The results 
in Table VI negate this hypothesis and indicate that inter-
vention (B5 ) negatively affected the exchange rate, but the 
coefficient was insignificant. As can be seen from the 
intervention results~ the coefficient of intervention is 
negative in the Artus equation but insignificant, suggesting 
' . 
that foreign exchange was purchased at a time when it should 
have been sold. In the Argy equation, it is positive but 
insignificant, sugg~sting that even when intervention was in 
the right direction, not enough was being done to achieve 
French franc stability. 
The implication is that French franc management through · 
intervention contributed ·to nominal exchange rate instabil-
ity and uncertainty. Through the peg, the CFA franc would 
E1t 
It 
Eqn. 5: 
** 
-0.277 
(3.486) 
Eqn. 6 
* 
-573.560 
( 1. 606) 
= 
TABLE VI 
RESULTS: FRENCH INTERVENTION POLICY 
IN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET 
130 + /31 (m-m*) t + ' ,•, * ' ' * /32(~-y >t ~ B3(r-r >t 
+ B 4 ( rr-rr*) t + /35It + e1. 
* 
a c) + a 1 (E1t-E1t) + a2(E1t-E1t-1) + a 3UDt 
* 
ao + a1(Pt-Pt) + e3 
Artus' Equations (see Appendix: Eqns. 51a and 51c 
** 
0.995 
(11.162) 
* 
-17442 
( 1. 699) 
* 
-0.293 
(2'. 293) 
* 
-0.654 
(1: 645) 
** 
0.020 
(4.316) 
'R~SQUARE = .8226 
646.648 
(0.180) 
1420.593 
(0.180) 
R-SQUARE = .1009 
-0.000 
(0.694) 
* 
9348,. 398 
(0.610) 
72 
( 5) 
(6) 
(6a) 
Eqn. 7: 
** 
-0.643 
(5.847) 
Eqn. 8: 
* 
TABLE VI (Continued) 
Argy's Equations (see Appendix: Eqns. 52b and 52a 
** 
1.423 
(11.396) 
* 
* 
-0.228 
(1.517) 
0.240 
(0.511) 
R-SQUARE = .7860 
* 
0.009 
(1.631) 
0.000 
(0.077) 
* 
-557.878 
(1.620) 
-16131 
(1.569) 
0.042 
(0.504) 
787.245 
(0.097) 
9702.759 
( 1. 686) 
Note: 
** 
* 
R-SQUARE = .1024 
The number in parentheses below each coefficient is 
the t-ratio statistic 
Significant at .01 level 
Significant at .OS level 
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be unstable, affect the real exchange rate of the CFA coun-
tries, and impair their competitiveness. 
It therefore comes as no surprise that the CFA coun-
tries have been experiencing external (and internal) imbal-
ance problems as reported in various issues of Jeune 
Afrique, a francophone news magazine. These reports have 
cited the CFA franc peg to the French franc as one of the 
major causes of the economic problems faced by the CFA coun-
tries. The Economist (July 21, 1990} quotes the. French for-
eign Minister as recognizing "structural problems" within 
Africa's franc zone. One solution most economists agree on 
is to devalue the CFA franc. And the Economist wonders: 
... Mr Mitterand's rejection of a CFA devaluation 
last month makes little economic sense, given that 
the zone's payments deficit is running at nearly 
$4 billion a year (p. 82}. 
The intervention results support the monetary (asset 
market) view of exchange rate determination in which the 
relative demand for and ~upply of money determine the 
exchange rate. The coefficients of money supplies are of 
the expected signs and significant. They are not signifi-
cantly different from one (as shown in the following 
t-test) . Thus the neutrality hypothesis is supported by the 
" " data. The null hypothesis is H0 : ~ = ~ = 1. 
For Artus: 
0.994462-1 
= -.0622 
.089096 
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For Argy: 
1.423234-1 
tstat = = 3.389 
.124888 
The critical t-value (.01, df=137) is 2.576. The absolute 
value of the t-statistic for Artus is statistically 
insignificant, while that for'Argy is statistically signifi-
cant. Artus' ·result· supports the neutrality hypothesis, 
whereas Argy's does not. Hence, the results are mixed. 
* The sign on the relative income term (y-y ) is negative 
as expected and significant. 
The sign on the interest rate differential is negative, 
confirming Frankel's hypothesis. (see Frankel, 1979, p. 614). 
This result means that an increase in French interest rates 
(ceteris paribus) decreases the exchange rate (i.e., appre-
ciates the French franc) . 
The coefficient' of the expected long run inflation 
* . ' ' (~-~ ), prox1ed by the long term government bond interest 
differential, is of the expected positive sign and is sig-
nificant. These long term rates are important because they 
are one of the alternative costs of holding money, besides 
serving as a prdxy for anticipated inflation differentials. 
A rise in this variable leads to a reduction in real money 
demand and thus to higher prices and depreciation. 
The results confirm that the French authorities pursued 
a policy of leaning ~gainst the wind. The coefficient of 
the exchange rate (a1 ) is negative and significant in both 
(the Artus and Argy) intervention equations. The authori-
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ties also pursued a target exchange rate as the coefficient 
of the target rate (a 2 in the Artus equation) is positive. 
News affected the foreign exchange market behavior of 
the French. They reacted positively to past and current 
news (a4 and ~ 5 ) are both positive as in Dornbusch. 
In summary, the results of this part of the study have 
established that the Real Interest Differential theory 
explains well the behavior of the. French franc exchange 
rate. Its fluctuations were affected by the relative demand 
and supply of money. Attempts by the French monetary 
authorities to influence the exchange rate of the French 
.franc were unsuccessful, and sometimes even perverse (i.e., 
contributed to fluctuations, making the French franc unsta-
,. 
ble). The implication of this finding is-that French franc 
fluctuations and instability were transmitted to the CFA 
franc through to the peg. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE TRADE-SHARES MODEL 
The second part of this study looks at the effect of 
the peg on the trade flows of the CFA countries. The objec-
tive is to examine the collective pegging by the CFA coun-
tries of their currency, the CFA franc, to the French franc 
and its effects on their trade performance. In particular, 
the study looks at the competitive aspects of this type of 
exchange rate regime. An important issue and the focus of 
the research is the export performance and the pattern of 
trade of the CFA countries, and the role played by their 
choice of exchange rate regime in this process. Of interest 
is whether such an exchange rate regime could be a source of 
trade diversion, rather than trade creation, and thus a 
source of welfare loss for the CFA countries. 
Methodology 
This study employs market share analysis of developing 
countries in developed markets. The export performance of 
the CFA countries and their competitors depends on develop-
ments within given markets, and on changes in their competi-
tive strength relative to that of other exporting countries. 
While a country's market share depends on such factors as 
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changes in tastes and import restrictions in the importing 
country, the objective here is to analyse how import demand 
changes in the market for coffee and cocoa is reflected in 
the export shares of the exporting countries and the impact 
of the choice of exchange rate regime on the behavior of 
these shares. In this study, export shares are the main 
indicator of the CFA countries' competitiveness. It is a 
disaggregated study of export commodities (coffee and cocoa) 
that are the principal sources of foreign exchange earnings 
for the countries under consideration. 
The analytical approach is demand-oriented and is based 
on the Armington (1969) model. Exports of different coun-
tries can be considered as products, differentiated by coun-
try of origin. This gives rise to less than infinitely 
elastic demand curves for the products. It contrasts with 
previous studies which assume that the demand for exports of 
developing countries is infinitely elastic, especially if 
the exports are primary commodities. Based on Armington's 
framework, primary commodity exports might at first sight 
seem to be homogeneous but, 'on closer examination, they are 
in fact differentiated. This type of differentiation is 
referred to as horizontal differentiation (Lord, 1989). 
Commodities are horizontally differentiated when importers 
differ in their choice of the geographic region of the good 
as a result of attributes related to the export of a prod-
uct, despite the possible absence of price or quality varia-
tions from country to country. Perceived differences in 
commodity exports can result from the manner in which they 
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are sold or from relationships which have been established 
between trading partners. For instance, adjustment costs 
are involved in switching from one supplier to another, such 
as the loss of preferential t.erms offered by exporters to 
established importers and to trading partners having histor-
ical and political ties wit~ them. There is also the risk 
of unreliable alternative foreign supply sources. In gen-
eral, importers would prefer to diversify among supply 
sources either because they have a preference for a variety 
of attributes offered by different exporters, or because 
they would like to reduce the risk of supply disturbances 
associated with dependence on a few foreign supply sources 
(i.e., vulnerability to supply disruptions from foreign sup-
pliers). In summary, even though coffee and cocoa are 
traded in international markets, making exporters face 
exogenously determined prices, they can be treated as goods 
that are subject to product differentiation. Therefore, 
ceteris paribus, if an export good is differentiated in the 
eyes of the importer (whether the difference is imagined or 
real (i.e., if there is horizontal differentiation), an 
exporter's share in a given market will be a function of 
such differences. In this study, the focus is on the impact 
of exchange rate regime and relative prices on export market 
competitiveness. 
------
Demand Theory and the Model 
of Import Allocation 
------
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The model used to study the impact of the CFA-French 
franc peg on the competitive position and export performance 
of the CFA countries and their competitors is based on the 
work of Armington (1969a), Hickman (1969), Hickman and Lau 
(1973), Thursby and Thursby (1987), and Thursby, Johnson and 
Grennes (1986). Export performance, as reflected in a coun-
try's market share, .is examined via export demand equations 
where market shares are the ··result of import allocation 
according to prices. In Armington's model, total import 
demand for a good is first determined and is subsequently 
independently allocated among competing sources of supply 
based on relative prices so as to minimize cost. 
This method, referred to as the two-stage maximization 
or budgeting procedure, is based on the Hicksian model where 
there are m traded goods and n countries. If each good is 
supplied by a different country, then there would be mxn 
products which enter international trade. Thus, X is a vec-
tor of goods: 
X (X1 , ... , Xr , ..• , Xm), where for each r(r=1 , ... , m), 
Xr = (Xr1., ... , xrk , ... , xrnr) · 
The product vector or elementary variables can there-
fore be written as: 
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X= (Xll , •.. , Xlnl ' xrl , ... , xrk , ... , 
Xrnr ' Xml , •.. , Xmnm> 
Xr = (Xrl , ... , xrk , ... , Xrnr> {9) 
The price vector corresponding to this product vector 
is given by 
P = (Pll ' · · · ' Plnl ' Prl ' · · · '· Prk ' · · ·' 
Prnr' Pml , ..• , Pmnm> 
Based on Hicksian demand analysis, an index of 
importer's utility can be expressed as a function of all 
products entering international trade thus: 
U = U(X) {10) 
Given the price vector and national income, E, ex ante 
demand functions for each product can be derived by maximiz-
ing U(X) subject to the budget constraint E = PX. The 
implied product demand functions are 
c c c 
Xrk = Xrk(E, P11 , ... , Plnli Prl , ... , Prk , ... , 
Prnr' Pml , ... , Pmnm> (11) 
c for all r, k and j, j~k. That is Xrk (with associated 
price P~k) is exporter k's product in group r which is 
exported to country c. For example, if r = automobiles, c = 
c 
any import market, k = any exporting country, then Xrk is 
exporter k's export of automobiles (r) to import market c. 
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Each of these demand functions would involve mn prices. 
To simplify analysis, Armington suggests writing U(X) as 
where 
u = f(X11 , •.. , xlnl , ... , xrl , ... , xrk , ... , 
Xrnr '· · ·' Xml '· · ·' ~nm> <12 > 
u = F ( X 1 , . . . , xr , . . . . , xm) I xr = ( xr 1 , . . . , 
Xrk ' · · ,• ' Xrnr> {13} 
Xr = fr(Xrl , ... , Xrl ,._ .. , xrnr>' r = 1, ... , m. {14} 
In other words, Xr can be expressed as a quantity-index 
of (Xrl , ... , Xrk , ... , Xrnr> and all combinations of (Xrl 
, ... , Xrk , ... , Xrnr> which yield the same amount of X pro-
vide consumers with the same level of satisfaction. The 
first task is to seek the conditions under which {12} may be 
written as (13} and {14}. Equation {12} implies that the 
function f assigns a unique value of U to each combination 
of values of the products or ungrouped variables. We seek 
the conditions under'~hich ther~ exist functions fr{r=l 
, ... , m) which assign unique values of Xr to given values of 
Xrl , ... , Xrk' and a function F which assigns a unique value 
of U to given values of x 1 , ... , Xm, so that 
f (X 11 , ... , Xr k , ... , Xmnm) = F (X 1 , . . . , ~) 
= F[X1(X11 , ... , Xlnl) , .... , Xr(Xrl , ... , 
Xrnr) ' · · · ' Xm ( Xml ' • · · ' ~nm) J • {15} 
A necessary condition for the existence of such functions is 
that all possible changes in the variables Xrk lead to equal 
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changes in the values of the functions f and F (i.e., dU = 
df = dF) . Thus 
m nr ()f m oF 
df L: L: dXrk dF - L: dXr 
r=1 k=1 axrk r=1 axr 
m nr aF axr 
= L: L dXrk 
r=1 k=1 axr ark (16) 
Hence for all r, j, k(r=1, ... , m; j, k=1, ... , nr), 
at aF axr ()f oF axr 
= 
. 
= so that , , 
axrj axr axrj axrk axr axrk 
()f ()f axr axr 
-;---;-
axrj axrk axrj axrk (17) 
since Xr is only a function of the variables Xrl , ... , 
Xrnr' its partial derivatives and the ratios of its partial 
derivatives are also a function of the same variables. It 
follows therefore that: 
for all r, j, k(r=1 , •.• , m; j, k=1 I • • • I 
Equation (18) can be stated alternatively as: 
[ 
()f ()f ] 
axrj / axrk = o' 
for all q, r, i, j k(q,r=1, ... ,m;q~r) 
(i=1, ... ,nq;j,k=1, ... ,nr) 
(18) 
(19) 
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Equation (19) says that for (12) to be expressed in the form 
of (13) and (14), and thus permit the grouping of variables, 
the necessary and sufficient condition is that the marginal 
rate of substitution between any two variables in one group 
shall be a.function only of variables in that group, and 
therefore independent of the value of'any variable in any 
other group. This is what Armington (1969a) refers to as 
the assumption of independence. This assumption is one of 
the cornerstones of the two-stage budgeting procedure, 
according to which variables in a utility function are 
grouped and, for each group, a price index is defined as a 
function of prices of members of the group. First, the 
optimal distribution of a given total expenditure among the 
groups is determined by reference to price indices alone. 
Then the expenditure thus allocated to each group is dis-
tributed among the member.s of the group on the basis of 
their individual prices. Moreover, the quantity of each 
ungrouped variable in the ~tility function determined by 
this two-stage procedure is identical with the amount which 
would have been purchased if utility, based on. the ungrouped 
variables, had peen maximized with reference to all the 
individual prices without any grouping. Aggregation of un-
grouped variables into groups, according to this procedure, 
is said to be consistent (Green, 1962) • · 
Another requirement for the consistency of the two-
stage maximization procedure is that the product of each 
group quantity-index and price-index be equal to group 
expenditure. That is there must exist a set of price-
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indices, P 1 , •.. , Pm, where Pr = Pr (Prl , ... , Prnr>' such 
that group expenditure Er is a function only of total expen-
diture E and the values of the price-indices. Thus it is 
necessary to determine the conditions under which, if the 
prices of one group remain unchanged, a change in the price 
or prices in a second group affects quantities in the first 
group only by changing expenditure in the first group. 
The neces~ary and suffibient condition for the exis-
tence of a function permitti'ng both the consistency of the 
two-stage maximization procedure and the existence for each 
group of a quantity-index Xr and a price-index Pr such that 
group expenditure Er = PrXr(r = 1 , •.. , m), is that each 
quantity-index be a linear homogeneous function of the 
ungrouped variables. To understand this, let 
Er = P X' r r 
(20a) 
(20b) 
( 20c) 
If all Xrk are changed by the same proportion a, with 
each Prk held constant, then Er = PrXr must change by a. 
But with each Prk constant, Pr does not change. Hence Xr 
must change by a, and fr is homogeneous of degree one. This 
property is necessary to ensure that the product of group 
quantity-indices and group price-indices equal group expen-
diture. To ensure the existence of a price-index Pr such 
that PrXr = Er, it is necessary that Pr be a function only 
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of Prl , .•• , Prnr· To show this, define Pr = Er/Xr. Given 
any set of prices, Er is changed by a. Since the function 
fr is homogeneous, the group Engel curves or expansion paths 
are straight lines so that each Xrk and therefore also Xr 
will change by a. Therefore, P does not ch~nge and is a 
.r 
function of Prl , .. ~, Prnr· 
Finally, it is shown that if each quantity-index is 
homogeneous, of degree one (a property also kno~n as homoge-
neous functional separability of the util.ity function), then 
the two-stage maximization procedure is consistent as 
defined above. 
In the first stage, U = F(X1 , ~ .. , Xm)' is maximized 
subject to: 
·m 
:E 
r=1 
For all q, r = 1 , ... , m, this yields: 
( 21) 
In the second stage, Xr =, fr(Xrl , ... , Xrnr).is maxi-
mized subject to: 
For all j, k = 1 , ... , nr, this yields: 
87 
axrfoXrj = Prj 
oXrfoXrk prk 
(22) 
The following conditions must be satisfied for all q, 
r, j, k: 
autaxqj = Pqj 
~~axrk Prk 
a) If q=r, (i.e., within the same group) , 
autaxqj = autaxqcaxqfaxqj> = Pqj 
autaxqk autaxqcaxqfaxqk> Pqk 
b) If q*r, (i.e., between groups), 
autaxqj = autaxqcaxqfaxqj> = Pq(axqtaxqj> 
autaxrk autaxr (axrtaxrk> Pr (axrtaxrk> 
(23) 
our requirements are satisfied. To show this, recall that 
the necessmmmary conditions for maximization of Xr subject 
to: 
are that for all k = 1, ... , nr, 
where A is a Lagrange multiplier. If we multiply both sides 
of Equation (24} by Xrk and sum, we obtain: 
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But in (20), it has already been shown that Xr is linear 
homogeneous in the Xrk's; by using Euler's theorem, we have 
Xr = A.PrXr; from which we get A. = 1'/Pr. By substituting for 
A. in (24), we have Pr(oX/oXrk ~ Prk' as required. 
To render the above framework operational (in a form 
which can be estimated), a functional form for the quantity 
index, X~ (the import of good r into country c), satisfying 
the previously-mentioned assumptions, is necessary. The 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functional form 
satisfies these assumptions. Hereafter, to simplify nota-
tion, c will be written as c c c Xrk Xk, and Prk as Pk. 
According to this framework, c xr can be written as: 
= 
( 25) 
where 
nr be c ~ k = 1 and Pr is a constant greater than -1. 
k=1 
The cost-minimizing product demand functions take the form: 
( 26) 
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c c 
where= ar = 1/(l+ar) is the elasticity of substitution. 
Equation (26) postulates that importer c's demand for a 
c product k of commodity class r, Xk , can be expressed as a 
constant share of the demand for the commodity class, 
and a single relative price term: the-ratio of the price of 
the product to the price of the composite commodity in the 
importing country. It is a market share (or import alloca-
tion) equation which can be rewritten in the form of an 
export demand equation as follows: 
(27) 
where P~ is the price of country k's export of commodity r 
to importing country c, P~ is an index of the price of the 
composite commodity (X~) imported into country c. Because 
this export demand has been derived from a CES utility func-
tion (based on intersectoral substitution between commodity 
imports and all other goods; and on intrasectoral substitu-
tion among alternative export sources (i.e., based on the 
two-stage budgeting procedure), it is characterised by a 
unitary elasticity with respect to the level of import 
demand. This is theoretically consistent since a change in 
the level of demand by the importing country will, ceteris 
paribus, lead to a proportional change in the demand for 
exports of all supplying countries to that market. In (27), 
the responsiveness of export demand to relative price 
changes is given by the value of a~ which lies between 0 and 
-oo. The constant B0 measures the exporter's market share 
irrespective of relative price. 
As mentioned previously, horizontal differentiation 
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implies trade flows between countries are influenced by his-
torical, political, geographical or other consideration. 
Thus, even though exports to a given importing country might 
be homogeneous (as is the case for primary commodities), the 
export functions of competing exporters to given export mar-
kets can still be expected to be different. Such differ-
ences can be captured by the introducton of dummy variables. 
One issue of concern is the exchange rate regime adopted by 
each country following the breakdown of Bretton Woods system 
and the adoption of a variety of exchange regimes (flexible, 
single peg, SDR, or composite peg) by developing countries. 
Therefore, a dummy variable Dj is added to (27) to reflect 
differences in exchange rate arrangement between the 
exporters. It is introduced as follows: 
-a ~ o · 
[ ] c [ l P~/P~ r (X~) exp (Dj) J v"' (28) 
where Dj is the dummy variable for exchange rate regime. 
In addition to the variable representing the choice of 
exchange rate regime, we introduce a measure of real 
exchange rate variability to proxy for uncertainty in inter-
national transactions. The role of real exchange rate vari-
ability is controvertial. It has been argued [see e.g. IMF 
(1984) and Willet (1986) for surveys of the literature] that 
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real exchange variability has been detrimental to trade 
flows. The empirical literature has, however, yielded con-
flicting results. Medhora (1990) examined the impact of 
nominal exchange rate variability on CFA zone imports and 
found that it exerted no detrimental effect on real imports. 
Several studies have also looked at the link between 
exchange rate variability and international trade flows. 
Estimating export supply equations for five developing coun-
tries, Gupta [cited in Kenen and Rodrik (1986)] found a sta-
tistically significant and negative relationship between 
export supply and short term volatility in the nominal 
exchange rate. A 'Study by Coes (1980) of Brazil's adoption 
of a crawling peg in 1968 found that the subsequent reduc-
tion of real exchange rate uncertainty had large positive 
effects on exports. Rana (also cited in Kenen and Rodrik) 
found that volatility had negative effects on the imports of 
south Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. 
studies on the relationship between uncertainty and 
trade flows focusing ori the industrial countries include 
Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) who examined the bilateral trade 
of the u.s. and of Germany and other industrial countries 
and found no significant impact on the volume of trade. 
cushman (1983) followed up on Hooper and Kohlhagen's'study 
and found that volatility had a significant negative effect 
on trade flows. These contrasting results were due to dif-
ferences in measuring uncertainty. For Hooper and Kohlha-
gen, nominal exchange risk (uncertainty) was proxied by mean 
weekly absolute differences between current spot exchange 
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rates and past forward rates. Cushman used standard devia-
tions of quarterly changes in real exchange rates. Akhtar 
and Hilton {1983) found that nominal exchange rate volatil-
ity had statistically significant effects on the exports of 
the u.s. and Germany. 
In order to estimate the abov~ equation, it is neces-
sary to define relative prices and link these to the 
exchange rate. In the present ·international monetary sys-
tern, movements in the rates of exchange of a currency can 
influence the value of another currency and this will have 
repercussions on bilateral or multilateral trade flows 
through their effects on export and import prices. Thus 
relative prices are defined as: 
(29} 
c . . s 
where Pk 1s the supply pr1ce of exporter k to market c; Pk 
is the supply price of exporter k in k's currency; Rck = Rck 
(i.e., bilateral exhange value of a unit of the exporter's 
currency), k, in terms of the importer's currency, c, (if 
non-CFA exporter), and Rck = (RFF) (RFFo> (i.e., indirect 
bilateral rate due to the influence of the French franc on 
the CFA through the peg (if CFA exporter)); RFF is the CFA 
franc price of the numeraire (French franc: fixed at 50 CFA 
francs in exchange for one French franc) ; RFF is the 
numeraire currency price of a third currency. 
Theoretically, currency changes will affect transaction 
prices which will in turn induce a redirection of purchases 
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and sales. As an example, we examine the CFA franc zone. 
Specifically, importers of CFA countries' goods are expected 
to shift their purchases towards CFA products if the CFA 
franc depreciates or is devalued. In the price Equation, 
(29), the exchange rate term, Rck' shows how changes in the 
value of the CFA franc can occur. Since the CFA franc is 
pegged to the French franc, as the latter floats against 
other currencies, such fluctuations impact on the CFA franc. 
That is both currencies float jointly against other curren-
cies. As a result, any fluctuations in the French franc is 
automatically transmitted to the CFA franc. Through its 
effects on transaction prices, this can have repercussions 
on the trade flows of the CFA countries. These effects need 
not be the result of deliberate policy in those countries. 
To appreciate the ramifications of the CFA franc peg to 
the French franc, it is instructive to look at the effect of 
the peg on the stability of the real exchange rate of the 
CFA franc and therefore on their ability to compete. In a 
world of floating exchange rates, the real exchange rate of 
the CFA franc is a weighted average of the bilateral real 
exchange rate between the CFA franc and the currencies of 
their trading partners, due to multilateral currency link-
ages between those currencies and the CFA franc. That is, 
(30) 
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where 
Erz = the multilateral real exchange rate of the CFA 
.franc 
z = the CFA zone or countries 
wj = weights which sum to one 
E · the real exchange rate relative to a particular 
rJ = 
trading partn~r and is defined as: 
Erj = E . ZJ (Pj/Pz] ( 31) 
p. = J the price level of trading partner j 
p = z the price level in th~ CFA zone 
Ezj the CFA franc price of currency j, and can be bro-. 
ken into the CFA franc pr'ice of the numeraire cur-
rency (French franc), and the numeraire currency 
price of currency j; i.e. 
Ezj ~ Ezp [EFj l (32) 
Through substitution of the above equations into (32), the 
latter can be written as: 
n 
I: 'Y·Ep· j=l J J ( 3 3) 
j;eF 
where 
Erzf = the real exchange rate of the zone relative to the 
French franc 
EFj = the real exchange rate of the numeraire relative 
to other currencies j 
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Equation (33) shows that the real exchange rate changes 
of the CFA franc consist of the part arising from changes in 
the numeraire country (France), and the part arising from 
changes between the numeraire and other trading partners. 
Thus even if pegging to the French franc eliminates one 
source of disturbance (the first expression on the right 
hand side) , changes and variations between the French franc 
and other currencies will affect the real exchange rate of 
the CFA franc. Such real exchange rate disturbances will 
have real effects which are reflected in the trade flows of 
the CFA countries. 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This study investigates the impact of the CFA franc peg 
to the French franc on the export share in two commodities 
of critical importance to the CFA countries, namely coffee 
and cocoa. Estimation combines annual time-series for the 
period 1973-1984 for a cross-section of cocoa and coffee 
exporting nations. It is assumed that the relation between 
export shares and the explanatory variables (relative price, 
import volume, and exchange rate variability, a proxy for 
uncertainty and risk, and a dummy variable for choice of 
exchange rate regime) is linear and the variance of the 
-error term for different exporters is the same. The esti-
mating equation is of the form: 
c ~ 'Y X~t= B0 [P~/P~ J11r(X,tl ,(V) [ exp (Djtl] •t ,k=l, ••• ,N (34) 
the bilateral exports (quantity) from k to c 
(Source: United Nations: Yearbook of International 
Trade Statistics: Vol II: Commodity Trade Matri-
ces: 1973-1984) 
the export price of k's export into c (which 
s 
equals k's export price in domestic currency, Pk, 
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multiplied by the value of k's currency in terms 
of c, Rck> 
the export price in k's currency: proxied by the 
per unit export price (= the dollar value of 
exports declared by ~he exporter divided by the 
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quantity of exports). converted into domestic cur-
rency U?ing IFS conversion factors (Source: ibid) 
V = stands for variability (a proxy for uncertainty 
and risk) 
c bilateral exchange rate computed from 'IFS Rk = sources 
as: Ck/Cc =. (Ck/$) I (Cc/$) 
which yields Rkc· Then Rck = 1/Rkc· (Source: 
IMF: International Financial Statistics (IFS}: 
Supplement on Exchange Rates, 1985} 
D· = J a dummy variable to classify exporting countries 
according to French franc (and non-French franc) 
peggers 
an index of competitors' export prices in ·c 
computed as: 
where weights. wk sum to unity and are given by an 
exporter's share in a given market; i.e., 
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The estimating equation in log-linear form can be 
expressed as: 
(35) 
or 
(36) 
The expected sign of the coefficient of the relative 
price term, which measures the elasticity of substitution 
c (or) between two exporters in a given export market, is neg-
ative. This means that for the CFA countries, their export 
share can be affected by factors that influence the price 
they charge in their export market. This is important 
because by being pegged to the French franc, changes in the 
latter automatically and simultaneously affect the CFA cur-
rency and (through the price equation) their export price. 
The effect of this on the.relative price of CFA exports will 
therefore be influenced in a rather exogenous way by the 
behavior of the French franc. 
The sign of the coefficient of the variable (X~), the 
total import of a commodity, is expected to be positive. 
This is because an increase in the level of imports will, 
ceteris paribus, lead to a proportional increase in the 
exports of each exporting country to a given market. Since 
a CES utility function is assumed, the coefficient of the 
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c 
total import term, Xr, is expected to be equal to one. 
The coefficient of V, the risk term, is expected to be 
negative if variability of the real exchange rate introduces 
uncertainty and inhibits trade. 
The dummy variable representing French franc peggers 
could be positive or negative reflecting institutional 
arrangements. For example, it can be positive for exports 
to countries such as France andjor EC member countries due 
to preferential treatment or if supply disturbances else-
where cause a shift of trade to the CFA countries. One 
important question is whether export functions differ by 
export market. That is, is there an export demand function 
unique to each export market or is there one overall export 
demand function for all the export markets? Thus, we test 
whether pooling all export functions into a single one is 
appropriate. This is the hypothesis of homogeneity of 
export functions across export markets. If the hypothesis 
is rejected by the data, then separate export-shares equa-
tions need to be estimated for each market. The testing for 
homogeneity of export functions across export markets is 
performed as follows: 
1} A regression is run for each export market sepa-
rately to obtain its residual sums of squares SSEi 
(i = 1 , ... , N). This gives the residual sums of 
squares of the unrestricted model under the hy-
pothesis that each export market has its own 
unique export function. 
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2) A regression is then run for all export markets 
together to obtain the residual sums of squares of 
the pooled model, SSEP. This yields the 
restricted residual sums of squares under the 
hypothesis that there is one export function com-
mon to all export markets. 
3) An F,test on the equality of coefficients across 
export markets is then performed us~ng the F 
statistic, 
= SSEp - ( ( SSE1 +SSE2+ .... +SSEN)) /k 
SSE1+SSE2+ .... +SSE~ 1 n 1+n2+ ... +nN- 2k 
(37) 
which is distributed F(k, n1 + n 2 + .... + nN- 2k), 
and k is the number of parameters estimated 
including the intercept, while n 1 , n 2 , ... nN are 
the observations for each export market (i = 1, 2, 
••• I N) • 
4) The F statistic, Fcal' is then checked against the 
F value from the tables to conduct the test. If 
the test does not reject the hypothesis· of equal-
ity of coefficients, then the data can be pooled. 
The calculated values of the F-test are 324.30 and 
89.95 for the coffee and cocoa markets respectively. The 
hypothesis of equality of coefficients across export markets 
is rejected in both cases at the .01 level. Thus a separate 
export demand function should be estimated for each export 
market. 
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Another issue of importance is whether, in a given 
export market, the export function of the CFA countries, by 
reason of their being pegged to the French franc, is differ-
ent from that of their competitors. Thus it is necessary to 
test whether the two CFA countries (Cameroon and Cote 
d'Ivoire) and their (non-CFA) competitors can be pooled or 
regressions need to be run as two separate groups. To carry 
out this test, one regression 1s run for Cote d'Ivoire and 
Cameroon to obtain their ~um·of squared residuais (SSE1 ). A 
second regression is run for the remaining exporting coun-
tries to obtain,theirs (SSE2). Then a third (pooled) 
regression is run for all countries together to get the sum 
of squared residuals for the combined sample (SSEc) . The F 
statistic is given by: 
[SSEc- (SSE1 + SSE2 )] /k 
SSE + SSE / (n + n -2k) 
1 2 1 2 
,(38) 
where k is the number of parameters estimated, and n 1 and n 2 
are the number of observations. This F statistic is dis-
tributed F(k, n 1 + n 2 - 2k). 
The results on Table VII indicate generally that the 
hypothesis of equality of regression coefficients according 
to CFA and non-CFA grq~pings cannot be rejected. Thus pool-
ing of the CFA and non 'CFA countries into one estimating 
equation is appropriate. 
Country 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United States 
West Germany 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
France 
Italy 
United States 
West Germany 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Japan 
TABLE VII 
RESULTS: TEST FOR GROUPING ACCORDING 
TO CFA AND NON-CFA 
·COCOA 
COFFEE 
Note: The 95% critical level of the F test for cocoa 
results are 2.74. 
The 95% critical level of the F test for coffee 
results is 2.60. 
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F-cal 
32.86 
0.87 
16.82 
4.29 
2.57 
0.53 
2.80 
19.50 
6.65 
2.47 
2.31 
2.11 
1.34 
1.24 
1.43 
0.24 
Equation (36) is estimated using cross-section and 
time-series data from several coffee and cocoa exporting 
countries for the period 1973-1984. The results are shown 
in Tables VIII and IX. 
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There are several methods for pooling cross-section and 
time-series data (e.g., Judge et al, 1982, Ch. 11 and 16; 
Judge et &1, 1980,' 'ch. 6 and 8; Kmenta, 1986, Ch. 12). The 
Fuller a~d Battese method (or error components model) avoids 
the use of dummy variable regression. It analyzes time-
series and crbss-section data under the assumption of a 
variance component error structure similar to the common 
two-way random effects model with covariates. The variance 
components are estimated by the fitting of constants method; 
then the regression parameters are obtained through general-
ized least squares. Park's method allows for contemporane-
ously correlated and autoregressive error structures. 
Methodologically, it is akin to the method of Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions (Zellner, 1962), except that it allows 
for an autoregressive error structure. 
The results in Tables VIII and IX are in general agree-
ment with those of Lord (1989). Hi~ estimates of the short 
run relative price elasticity of export demand for coffee 
range between -0.34 and -2.76. The coefficients for coffee 
in this study range between -0.42 and -0.75. His estimates 
for cocoa range between -0.22 and -0.34, while the coeffi-
cients in this study range between -0.47 and -0.87. Lord's 
TABLE VIII 
COFFEE: EXPORT SHARES EQUATIONS 
Importing Country 
Regressors Germany Japan USA UK Italy Nether- France Denmark Belgium 
lands 
** ** ** ** ** ** * ** 
Intercept -0.205 1. 871 -18112 -1.406 0.455 1.181 -1.254 -0.200 1.832 
(2.881) (13.510) (3.791) (4.295) (1.410) (8.824) (9.736) (1.950) (5.445) 
Relative ** ** ** ** ** ** > ** ** ** 
Price -0.424 -0.488 -0.136 -0.754 -0.468 -0.679 -0.520 -0.742 -0.613 
(49.458) (51.100) (8.080) (66.510) (37.700) (98.220) (30.340) (149.120) (30.790) 
Import ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Volume 0.922 0.913 0.885 > 0. 993 1.046 0.870 1.044 1.039 0.938 
(231.850) ( 111. 700) (26.630) (38.140) (53.400) (95.460) (196.300) (153.140) (34.070) 
Real 
Exchange ** ** * ** ** ** 
Rate Var- -1.759 -0.263 -0.736 -0.562 -0.447 -2.805 -0.941 -1.197 -0.763 
abililty (8.651) (1.756) (3.518) ( 1. 410) (1.740) (12.190) (3.836) (6.880) (1.674) 
Dummy ** ** ** ** ** ** * 
for CFA/ -0.442 0.550 0.131 0.017 0.845 0.419 0.959 -0.158 -0.217 
non-CFA (10.483) (4.228) (0.446) (0.147) (19.900) (8.815) (11.390) (7.458) (2.424) 
Number of 
Observers 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
MSE 1.020 1.026 1.072 0.961 2.913 0.985 0.899 0.100 0.922 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis below each coefficient are the t-ratio statistics 
** Significant at the .01 level 1-' 
* Significant at the .OS level 0 
""" 
TABLE IX 
COCOA: EXPORT SHARES EQUATION 
Importing Country 
Regressors Germany UK Netherlands Italy Belgium USA France 
** ** ** ** 
Intercept 1.028 -24.505 -1.040 -.281 1.270 -21.210 -9.933 
(0.699) (2.350) (0.784) (0.539) (3.374) (4.824 (3.112) 
Relative ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Price -0.474 -0.877 -0.546 -0.682 -0.728 -o. ns -0.549 
(22.250) (28.340) (18.070) (23.400) (25.580) (17.910) (19.566) 
Import ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Volume 0.858 3.000 1.040 1.060 0.870 2.611 1.816 
(6.679) (3.320) (10.000) (21.210) (22.273) (7.372) (6.377) 
Real * ** * 
Exchange -0.015 -0.653 -o .112 -0.921 -0.3~1 -0.890 -0.265 
Rate Var- (0.058) (2.020) (0.711) (5.087) (1.454) (2.529) (1.670) 
abililty 
Dummy ** ** ** ** ** ** 
for CFA/ 2.119 0.639 3.015 2.788 3.211 -0.191 3.448 
non-CFA (15.210) (3.690) (18.200) (13.390) (12.001) (1.863) (26.610) 
Number of 
Observers 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
MSE 1.042 1.022 0.907 0.882 0.834 0.900 0.924 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis below each cofficient are the t-ratio statistics 
** Significant at the .01 level 
* Significant at the .OS level 1-' 
0 
Ul 
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import demand elasticity for coffee ranges between -0.01 and 
2.70, as compared to 0.91 and 1.05 here. For cocoa, Lord's 
import demand elasticity ranges between -2.35 and .24, while 
our range is between .90 and 3.00. 
Next, we test whether import demand elasticity is not 
significantly different from one, a conclusion following 
from the CES utility function. The t-test statistic for 
this purpose is given by: 
" S(~) 
" where~ is the estimated import demand elasticity coeffi-
" cient and s(~) is the standard error of the estimated coef-
ficient. The results are shown in Table X. They indicate 
that the hypothesis that the elasticity of import demand is 
unity (1) cannot be rejected in about half of the export 
markets. This finding is consistent with the import demand 
elasticity of one implied by the assumption of a CES utility 
function. 
Lord (1989) indicates that the weighted and trade-
weighted average price elasticity of export demand is -0.5. 
Most of the elasticity coefficients in this study in all 
export markets studied are close to this value. A sta-
tistical test is conducted to determine if the estimated 
relative price elasticities are significantly different from 
-.5. The results are presented in Table XI. In about half 
of the cases, the results are consistent' with Lord's 
Country 
West Germany 
Japan 
United States 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
Netherlands 
France 
Denmark 
Belgium 
West Germany 
United Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Italy 
Belgium 
United States 
France 
TABLE X 
RESULTS: TEST OF IMPORT DEMAND 
ELASTICITY OF UNITY 
COFFEE 
COCOA 
Note: The 95% critical values for the t-test are 1.98 for 
coffee and 2.00 for cocoa. 
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t-stat 
19.60 
10.62 
7.56 
0.27 
1.80 
14.24 
8.30 
5.74 
2.26 
1.10 
2.21 
0.38 
1.20 
0.26 
4.55 
2.87 
C o u n t r y  
G e r m a n y  
J a p a n  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  
I t a l y  
N e t h e r l a n d s  
F r a n c e  
B e l g i u m  
D e n m a r k  
F r a n c e  
G e r m a n y  
I t a l y  
N e t h e r l a n d s  
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
B e l g i u m  
T A B L E  X I  
R E S U L T S :  T E S T  O F  E L A S T I C I T Y  O F  
S U B S T I T U T I O N  O F  - . 5  
C O F F E E  
C O C O A  
N o t e :  T h e  9 5 %  c r i t i c a l  t - v a l u e s  a r e  1 . 9 8  f o r  c o f f e e  a n d  
2 . 0 0  f o r  c o c o a .  
1 0 8  
t - s t a t  
8 . 8 7  
1 . 3 1  
0 . 0 6  
2 2 . 4 7  
0 . 2 6  
2 5 . 8 1  
4 . 8 8  
5 . 6 5  
4 8 . 2 0  
1 .  7 4  
1 . 2 1  
6 . 2 4  
1 . 5 2  
1 2 . 2 0  
5 . 3 9  
1 . 9 8  
weighted and trade weighted price elasticity of export 
demand of -0.5. 
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The results indicate that horizontal differentiation by 
exchange rate regime is an important determinant of export 
flows. Most, if not all re~at'ive price coefficients, are 
negative and significant. In addition·, the dummy variable 
which has been 'added to capture pegging of the CFA franc is 
also significant in,most cases. Thus the joint float of the 
CFA franc with the French franc has real effects on their 
export flows. 
On the whole, pegging to the French franc has positive 
and significant effects on the exports of the CFA countries. 
It is worth pointing out here that the export markets in 
which pegging to the French franc has a significant negative 
effect on trade flows are Germany (for the cocoa markets) 
and U.S., Germany, Belgium, and Denmark (for the coffee mar-
kets). It is noteworthy that two of these markets (U.S., 
Germany) are the two most important international markets. 
Moreover, the dummy variable is positive and highly 
significant in the case of coffee and cocoa exports to 
France. This lends support to the claim that single pegging 
inhibits efforts to diversify trade to non-numeraire trading 
partners. Also, because of historical andjor institutional 
arrangements, CFA exports to the major non-numeraire coun-
tries are hampered, while the CFA zone arrangements encour-
age exports to France. A positive sign is registered for 
exports to Japan and other European export markets (except 
Belgium and Denmark, even though they are part of the EC). 
The positive sign on the other European countries can be 
explained by the fact that, being tied directly or indi-
rectly to the'EC, trade agreements with the latter tend to 
be favorable to the CFA countries. 
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Critics of the franc zone claim that the institutional 
arrangement which maintains the CFA-French franc peg perpet-
uates monetary, financial and commercial dependence. Trade-
wise, or commercially, it is claimed that the arrangement 
guarantees France a closed market. A test is thus conducted 
to determine whether the CFA-French franc peg makes the CFA 
zone a closed market for France with respect to CFA exports. 
Using the test procedure under Equation (38), the 
research question is whether CFA countries'' export function 
in the French market is significantly different from that in 
non-French markets taken together. If the peg does not 
close the CFA zone.as a French market, then the CFA export 
function to France will not be statistically different from 
that to non-French markets taken together~ 
The results obtained yielded the F-statistics 9.0345 
(cocoa exports) and 14.6352 (coffee exports). The F value 
from the tables for the .01 level of significance was 3.02. 
Thus for both cocoa and coffee exports, the results are sta-
tistically different, ·indicating that the institutional 
arrangement which maintains the CFA-French franc peg closes 
the CFA zone as a French market. 
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our results indicate that exchange rate variability 
hampers bilateral commodity flows. The variabi~ity term is, 
in most cases, negative and significant. Increased risk due 
to exchange rate. variability causes uncertainty in traders, 
casting doubts on the profitability of some of their inter-
national engagements, thus reducing the amount of trade 
below that which would ·otherwise have been possible. 
Even if forward cover were available, exchange rate 
variability (hence risk and uncertainty) would still lead to 
a reduction in trade because, as Medhora (1990) points out: 
... First, the transaction costs of buying cover 
increase the costs of trade. Second, the forward 
rate is a poor predictor of the future spot rate. 
Third, trading firms cannot'always plap the mag-
nitude or timing of all their foreign exchange 
transactions. Fourth, forward markets in foreign 
exchange are incomplete in both length of cover 
offered, and location--this being a particular 
problem for the smal+er less developed countries. 
Thus hedging is both an imperfect and costly 
method of avoiding exchange risk (p. 314). 
These arguments notwithstanding, Medhora points out 
that "the weight of ~mpirical evidence to date shows little 
effect of exchapge rate variability on trade." About these 
studies, he argues that' most were "pre-73" while early 
"post-7 3" results we,re "preliminary~' and. "te·ntati ve" because 
"contracts and trading relationships are made over a number 
of years, and will not be. broken or changed right after a 
new regime begins." This "inertia" eff~ct may then result 
in understating the true costs of exchange rate variability 
on trade. This will lead to the erroneous conclusion that 
variability has no effect on trade flows. 
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When it comes to empirically measuring exchange rate 
variability, a number of different measurements exist [see 
Kenen and Rodrik {1984) and Medhora {1990)]. The most com-
mon measure of exchange,rate variability used as a proxy for 
risk is the standard deviation. In this study, the standard 
deviation {an index of variability) of the change in the 
logarithm of the real effective exchange rate is used. A 
country's rea~ exchange rate is a price-adjusted nominal 
exchange rate {i.e., the nominal exchange rate times the 
ratio of the foreign price ievel to the domestic price 
level). To measure a country's competitiveness relative to 
its major trading partners, the real effective exchange rate 
is used; and it is calculated as the nominal effective 
exchange rate times the ratio of a suitable price index for 
its major trading partners to its own price index. The real 
effective exchange rate used in this dissertation is calcu-
lated for the ten most important trading partners and the 
weights used are total trade volume (i.e., exports plus 
imports) . 
For each year of the period studied (1973-1984), the 
variance is, based on annual real effective exchange rate 
(REER) observ~tions of the twelve preceding years. For exam-
ple, the variability measure for 1973 is bas~d on the years 
1960-1972; for 1974, it is based on the 'years 1961-1973, and 
so on. Besides the study by Lord, there are few studies 
dealing with disaggregated exports of coffee and cocoa. 
Lovasy and Boissenneault (1961) obtained a relative price 
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elasticity of export demand for Colombian coffee of 
-1.59; for "other Latin Coffees" of -2.76; and for "Robusta 
Coffee" (from all sources) of -0.98. 
-" 
In a more, recent study, Marian Bond (1987), summarizing 
results of coffeefcocoa export demand and supply elastici-
ties, quoted Askari and Cummings as having obtained a value 
of -.4 for the short run price elasticity, and .4 for the 
income elasticity of demand for coffee. 
The results of the shares equation reported in Tables 
VIII and IX constitute a general test of competitiveness and 
variability and do not differentiate between CFA and non-CFA 
effects on export functions.' To do this, interaction terms 
are introduced to test for the effect of CFA membership on 
export functions. 
Two issues are of interest here: 
(1) whether pegging affects the competitiveness of CFA 
countries; 
(2) whether pegging exposes CFA countries to real 
exchange rate variability and impacts on their 
trade flows. The model can therefore be written 
as: 
c ~lnXr + -ylnV 
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(39) 
where D is the dummy variable representing CFA export~rs and 
is interacted with the. relative price and variability terms 
for the purpose of addressing the two issues just raised. 
If 0=1, then (39) gives the expected export share of 
the CFA countries as: 
[ :~) 
( 40) 
If membership in the Franc zone has important implications 
for competitiveness and variability, the coefficients o1-arc 
and o2 + ~ should be significantly different from zero. 
Hence, CFA export functions-are affected by the peg of the 
CFA franc to the French franc. 
The estimation results are given in Tables XII and 
XIII. With respect to Equation (31), the interaction coef-
ficients o1 and o2 yield respectively the marginal 
effect (additional effect) of rel~tive prices (P~/~~ ) and 
variability of exchange rate (V) for the CFA countries. To 
determine the impact of the effect for the CFA countries, 
the coefficients are added as indicated in Equation (40) and 
a t-test of their significance is conducted. To do this, 
the variance of the sum of the coefficients is needed. For 
Regressors Germany Japan 
* ** 
Intercept -0.210 1. 586. 
(2.591) (15.839) 
Relative ** ** 
Price -0.410 -0.487 
(41.949) (57.464) 
Import ** ** 
Volume 0.914 0.938 
(207.770) (154.940) 
Real 
Exchange ** ** 
Rate Var- -1.530 -0.295 
ability (7.413) (2.234) 
Dummy ** ** 
for CFA/ 3.011 5.060 
non-CFA (41.617) (30.726) 
Interaction 
of Dummy ** ** 
with -0.667 -0.483 
relative (44.300) (22.860) 
price 
TABLE XII 
EXPORT SHARES EQUATION: INTERACTION 
EFFECTS ON COFFEE 
Importing Country 
USA UK Italy Nether-
lands 
** ** ** ** 
-1.970 -1.290 0.706 0.945 
(4.234) ((26.670) (3.615) (6.992) 
** ** ** ** 
-0.136 -0.695 -0.447 -0.668 
(7.293) (250.800) (28.660) (82.790) 
** ** ** ** 
0.898 8.960 1.007 0.886 
(28.160) (258.200) (175.700) (94.320) 
** ** . ** 
-0.833 -0.222 -0.168 -2.790 
(3.565) (2.862) (0.886) (8.105) 
* ** ** ** 
0.957 0.582 4. 728 1.400 
(2.384) (46.940) (27.030) (19.990) 
** ** ** ** 
0.193 -o. 311 -0.482 -0.265 
(2.912) (116.900) (28.190) (27.180) 
France Denmark Belgium 
** * ** 
-1.341 -0.133 1.284 
(8.436) (0.646) (6.554) 
** ** ** 
·-0.594 , -0.713 -0.525 
(26.490) (53.880) (31.870) 
** ** ** 
1.049 1.018 0.940 
(269.900) (65.550) (71.260) 
** ** ** 
-1.381 -1.102 -1.239 
(3.826) (2.737) (3.611) 
** ** ** 
2.230 2.012 3.048 
(14.460) ( 18.460 ), (24.630) 
** ** ** 
-0.332 -0.284 -0.450 
(14.460) (20.945) (26.721) 
.... 
.... 
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TABLE XII (Continued) 
Importing country 
Regressors Germany Japan USA UK Italy Nether- France Denmark Belgium 
lands 
Interaction 
of Dummy ** ** ** ** * ** 
with Real -4.026 -8.534 -2.281 ,4. 262 8.452 0.059 0.238 -1.041 -1.333 
Exchange -( 11.826) (8.472) (0.947) (35.770) (23.300) (0.095) (0.588) (1.810) (2.666) 
Rate Vari-
ability 
Number of 
Observers 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
MSE 1.031 0.988 0.994 1.022 1.016 0.987 0. 929- 1.029 0.975 
Note: The number in parenthesis below each coefficient is the t-ratio statistic 
*k Significant at the .01 level (critical t-value = 2.617) 
* Significant at the .OS level (critical t-value = 1. 980) 
Regressors France 
** 
Intercept -13.862 
(4.767) 
Relative ** 
Price -0.533 
(18.450) 
Import ** 
Volume 2.167 
(8.419) 
Real ** 
Exchange -0.318 
Rate Var- (2.246) 
abililty 
Dummy ** 
for CFA/ 5.106 
non-CFA (7.389)· 
Interaction 
of Dummy -0.111 
with {1.258) 
relative 
prices 
TABLE XIII 
EXPORT SHARES EQUATIONS: INTERACTION 
EFFECTS ON COCOA 
Importing Country 
Italy USA Belgium Germany 
** ** 
-0. 111 -11.710 0.480 6.333 
{1.167) (4.069) {1.469) (4.080) 
** ~** ** ** 
-0.706 -0.333 -0.455 -0.350 
(18.160) (8.352) (11.930) {23.710) 
** ** ** ** 
1.036 1.810 0.830- 0.359 
(16.460) (7.760) (7.670) {2.660) 
** ** ** 
-0.604 -0.803 -0.166 0.449 
{ 2. 859) (3.884) ( 1. 014) (3.834) 
** ** ** ** 
4.927 2.520 6.230 6.499 
(9.476) (7.423) (12. 020) {25.690)' 
** ** ** ** 
-0.248 -0.634 -0.530 -0.688 
(3.978) {13.1JO) (9.622) {20.350) 
UK Netherlands 
** * 
-31.880 -1.310 
(3.922) {1.854) 
** ** 
-0.851 -0.534 
(25.180) . {17.850) 
** ** 
3.620 1.060 
{5~130) (8.750) 
-0.228 -0.127 
(0.775) (0.779) 
** * 
3.740 1.080 
(6.900) {1.933) 
** 
-0.197 0.241 
(3.750) ( 1. 442) 
1-' 
1-' 
-..) 
TABLE XIII (Continued) 
Importing Country 
Regressors France Italy USA Belgium Germany 
Interaction 
of Dummy ** ** 
with Real -11.297 -0.543 -24.780 0.666 -0.884 
Exchange (2.594) (0.249) (6.394) (0.224) (0.398) 
Rate Vari-
ability 
Number of 
Observers 72 72 72 72 72 
MSE 0.931 0.698 1.027 0.870 1.049 
Note: The number in parentheses below each cofficient is the t-ratio statistic 
** Significant at the .01 level (critical t-value 2.66) 
* Significant at the .05 level (critical t-value = 2.00) 
UJ{ 
** 
-27.010 
(4.930) 
72, 
0.972 
Netherlands 
3.676 
(1.027) 
72 
0.946 
..... 
..... 
00 
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example, in Equation {40), var(~+o2 ) = var(~) + var(o 2 ) + 
2cov(~,o 2 ). Estimates for the variances and covariances are 
obtained from the variance-covariance matrix. The results 
for the t-ratio test are shown in Tables XIV and XV. 
In both coffee and cocoa regressions, the results indi-
cate that in the majority of cases, the joint float of the 
CFA franc with the French franc significantly affected 
bilateral coffee and cocoa exports, increasing the negative 
impact of real exchange rate variability and the elasticity 
of substitution on their trade flows. 
Market 
Denmark 
Japan 
United States 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Italy 
France 
Germany 
France 
Belgium 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
United States 
TABLE XIV 
CFA VARIABILITY INTERACTION: EfFECTS 
ON COFFEE/COCOA MARKET SHAR~S 
.:COFFEE 
COCOA 
'' 
,, 
Note: The 95% critical t-values are 1. 98 for. coffe,e and 
2.00 for cocoa. 
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t-stat 
5.127 
8.052 
3.506 
7.326 
29.171 
5.990 
26.704 
9.755 
18.142 
2.678 
2.604 
3.491 
2.131 
2.218 
5.001 
6.623 
TABLE XV 
CFA RELATIVE PRICE INTERACTION: EFFECTS 
ON COFFEE/COCOA MARKET SHARES 
Market 
COFFEE 
France 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
United states 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
Germany 
COCOA 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Note: The 95% critical level are 1.98 for coffee and 
2.00 for cocoa. 
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t-stat 
621.476 
49.262 
175.932 
351.440 
1. 784 
198.332 
186.234 
107.398 
96.867 
30.523 
6.998 
34.119 
1.800 
17.816 
23.622 
33.399 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical Findings 
The motivation for this dissertation has been the ]oint 
float of the French and CFA francs against other major cur-
rencies. Joint floating is an issue of importance in the 
contemporary international monetary system because, by peg-
ging the CFA franc to the French franc, its international 
value is determined by the value of the French franc rela-
tive to the other major currencies. Hence, any instability 
in its value will be transmitted to the CFA franc through 
the peg. Consequently, the CFA franc will be subject to 
arbitrary devaluations or revaluations. These will affect 
its real exchange rate and therefore impact on the ability 
of the CFA countries to compete internationally. 
The main question investigated is whether the peg of 
the CFA franc to the French franc has exposed the CFA coun-
tries to real exchange rate variability (brought about by 
instability in the French franc), thus inhibiting their 
trade flows, especially their efforts to diversify their 
trade to non-French markets. It has also been the objective 
of the dissertation to see if the peg has affected the 
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competitiveness of the CFA countries and thus their market 
share. 
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To this end, the focus of the dissertation has been, as 
a first step, to investigate whether the French monetary 
authorities have been successful in stabilizing the value of 
the French franc in the inte'rnational financial markets. 
Then, as a second step, it has focused on whether the indi-
rect connection of the CFA franc to other major currencies 
through the French franc, has had a significant impact on 
trade flows .between the CFA countries and those countries. 
The finding of the first objective (i.e., determining 
whether French intervention policy was stabilizing or desta-
bilizing) is that, in pursuing a policy of leaning against 
the wind, the French authorities destabilized the French 
franc. 
The implication of this finding is that, as the French 
franc floats against other major currencies, such fluctua-
tions are transmitted to the CFA franc through the peg. As 
a result, the CFA franc will be exposed to arbitrary devalu-
ations and revaluations which will impact on the trade flows 
of the CFA countries for reasons not connected to.deliberate 
policy on-their ·part. 
If such effects are undesirable, it would be necessary 
to counteract them. Fo.r example, if the peg resui ts in an 
overvalued or unstable CFA franc (henc~ in trade deficits or 
inhibition of trade respectively), the CFA currency should 
be devalued andjor other exchange rate regime that can over-
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come variability should be adopted. The institutional 
arrangement of the franc zone prevents this from happening, 
making it an unresponsive and inefficient institutional 
arrangement. 
The second objective of this study was to investigate 
whether, by pegging the CFA franc to the French franc and 
exposing it to the instability of the French franc, the com-
petitiveness and trade of the CFA countries were signifi-
cantly affected due to the exogenous effects of the French 
franc on the CFA franc through the peg. To investigate this 
question, a model that is applicable to disaggregated com-
modities, such as coffee and cocoa that are studied in this 
research, was needed. Such a model should also allow one to 
address the question: given that a country's market share 
(an indicator of competitiveness, export performance and 
trade patterns) depend on such factors as changes in tastes 
and import restrictions in the importing countries, how are 
changes in import demand for coffee and cocoa reflected in 
the export shares of the CFA countries? 
The model that allows this question to be addressed is 
Armington's (1969). Originally conceived to be applied to 
aggregate merchandise trade, this demand-oriented model can, 
under certain qualifications {Thursby, Johnson, and Grennes, 
1986; Lord, 1989), be applied to highly disaggregated data 
such as coffee and cocoa. Even though highly disaggregated 
commodities (especially primary commodities) might be con-
sidered homogeneous so that intraindustry trade theory and 
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analysis would be inapplicable- due to the law of one price_, 
"horizontal differentiation" importers (Lord, 1989) and het-
erogeneity through "product quality or characteristic of 
contracts with particular countries" (Thursby, Johnson and 
Grennes, 1986} I account.for why primary commodities (e.g., 
coffee and cocoa, are subject to product differentiation). 
Granted I an exporter Is market share' 'ln' any_ export market 
will be affected by real or imagined dif~erences. In this 
research, the focus was on differentiation of'coffee and 
cocoa exporters by exchange rate regime (French franc or 
non-French franc pegger) . The market share was modelled 
according to Armington. 
Based on seVeral assumption~, an exporter's market 
share was expressed as a function of the-market size of a 
given category, and the price of an exporter's product in an 
export market relative to a composite price of competitors' 
exports in the market. This approach allowed one to focus 
on the role of relative prices (competitive effects), vari-
ability (risk and uncertainty) and "horizont.al differentia-
tion" on market shares. 
Specifica;t.ly, 'the mqdel permitted a focus on the 
effects of the relative prices of CFA coffee and cocoa 
exports, their real exchange rate variability and horizontal 
differentiation through choice of exchange rate regime, on 
their market shares. The .research question .was whether the 
CFA-French franc peg is a significant factor in determining 
the CFA countries' market share. The test of hypotheses 
implied by this question was performed using a series of F 
tests. 
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The results of pooling using Park's method are given in 
Tables VIII (coffee) and IX (cocoa) . These results provide 
answers to tests of the impact of competitiveness, variabil-
ity on market shares for all exporters without isolating the 
effect of being pegged to the French franc on such factors. 
To differentiate between CFA and non-CFA factors on ex-
port functions, interaction terms were introduced to test 
for the effect of pegging to the French, franc (i.e., CFA 
membership) on export functions (Tables XII and ,XIII). Two 
issues were addressed: whether pegging affected CFA coun-
tries' competitiveness, and whether pegging subjected the 
CFA countries to variability and uncertainty, thus inhibit-
ing their trade flows. The results are presented in Tables 
XIV and VX. Most, if not all, of the interaction terms for 
competitiveness and vartability are significant. 
These results indicate that the joint float of the CFA 
and French francs against other major currencies exposed the 
CFA countries to real exchange rate variability (thus 
inhibiting their trade), and it also significantly affected 
the relative price of their exports (thus impairing their 
international competitiveness). 
Economic Implications of 
Empirical Findings 
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The traditional argument in favor of pegging is that it 
avoids exchange rate variability and uncertainty with the 
currency to which it is pegged and therefore encourages more 
exchange transactions between both parties. It is also said 
to promot~ monetary discipline and, throu~h convertibility 
of the minor currency, fosters international confidence in 
its value, thereby attracting foreign investments for devel-
opment. The trade of the CFA countries has diversified con-
siderably since independence. Thus by pegging just to the 
French franc, which fluctuates against the major currencies, 
only one source of variability is eliminated. Other 
effects, due to the impact of other currencies on the French 
franc, will persist and affect exogenously the variability 
of the CFA franc, inhibiting their trade flows. This argu-
ment is confirmed by the finding that the interaction of the 
dummy variable with the variability term is statistically 
significant {Tables XII and XIII). 
Besides this finding, the literature on optimal pegging 
(Williamson, 1982} has demonstrated that pegging to one 
major currency, in the present managed floating system, is 
inefficient if the pegging country is engaged in diversified 
trade. To avoid the exogenous variability factor that char-
acterizes the single peg, more efficient regimes such as the 
basket or SDR pegs are recommended. 
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In addition to the finding, just discussed, that the 
peg exposes the CFA countries to exogenously imposed vari-
ability through the French franc, another finding of this 
study which has economic implications is that the institu-
tional arrangements of the franc zone has resulted in 
rigidities which not only qause economic problems for the 
CFA countries, but also hinder,economiq adjustment. Due to 
institutional arrangements, the peg has been characterized 
by a fixed parity of 50 CFA francs to the F~ench franc since 
1948. If the exchange rate, defined as the domestic cur-
rency price of,a unit of foreign exchange, is pegged below 
its equilibrium value, then it is overvalued. This makes 
foreign goods cheaper to locals, and makes domestic goods 
more expensive to foreigners. Thus the demand for foreign 
exchange is greater than the supply. A trade accounts 
deficit is often the result. 
If the nominal exchange rate as defined is adjusted by 
the ratio of a suitable foreign price index to a suitable 
domestic price index, the result is the real exchange rate. 
This variable is usually used as an indicator of a country's 
ability to compete internationally. It plays an important 
role in this research because it is used to examine whether 
the choice of the CFA countries to peg to the French franc 
has affected their competitiveness and export trade. If it 
does, then if the CFA countries are experiencing a trade 
deficit due to an overvalued real exchange rate, then the 
policy recommendation is that the real exchange rate should 
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be devalued. This presupposes the ability of the CFA coun-
tries to alter the exchange rate. 
In their case, this is not possible due to the peg. 
This aspect of their exchange rate arrangement has come 
under criticism (see, for examp,le·, Financial Times, May 24, 
1989, p. 24; West Africa Magazi~e, Aug. 3, 1987, p. 1471; 
- ' 
Economist, July 21, 19.90, p. 82; Jeune Afrique No. 1498, 
I 
Sept. ~8, 1989, p. 40;' and Vall~e (1989}, p. 38). Both the 
IMF and the World Bank, cited in some of these references, 
have considered the CFA franc "overvalued." 
This issue of an overvalued CFA franc hurting their 
competitiveness and deteriorating their trade has been ana-
lyzed in this research. Examined was whether the _pe~ 
affected the competitiveness and market share of the CFA 
countries. The F test ~esults (Table IX} in~icate indeed 
that the peg, by affecting their competitiveness (signi-
ficant relative price interaction effects}, had an impact on 
their export demand function.· 
What this result implies is that the persistent trade 
' ' 
deficits experienced by the CFA countries could be addressed-
through policies designed to_affect the real exchange rate. 
With prices slow to change, real exchange rate changes can 
be achieved more quickly through nominal exchange rate 
devaluation. The ·cFA countries have ·a tobl to address their 
•' 
trade problems but·they cannot use it because the CFA franc 
is rigidly maintained at parity by institutional arrange-
ments that prevent its being used fqr adjustment purposes. 
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Therefore, for these countries, economic disequilibria 
(both external and internal} will continue until relative 
price adjustments (rather than the more common and popular 
adjustments through fiscal, quantitative and administrative 
controls} are put into effect. A9ain, this presupposes con-
trol of the exchange rate' as a policy tool. This calls for 
a reconsideration of the peg· in its present format. 
concluding Statement 
As pointed out earlier in the critique of the litera-
ture, few studies exist on disaggregated analysis of exports 
by SITC categories, especially for primary commodities such 
as coffee and cocoa that are the main source of foreign 
exchange earnings for most developing countries. For these 
countries, relatiy~ price elasticities of export demand with 
respect to specific commodities are of more proximate con-
cern for short run (i.e. , agricultural cycle or yearly} pol-
icy decisions than the long run vi~w of J-curve policy deci-
sions based on absolute price elasticities of (aggregate} 
export demand. Our study is a contribution to this short 
run aspect of policy analysis,'which has been done by focus-
ing on the CFA countries and examining how their choice to 
peg their currency to the French franc has affected their 
competitiveness relative to other coffee and cocoa exporters 
in various export markets. 
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APPENDIX 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN THE FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE MARKET 
Framework to Investigate the Intervention 
Policy of the French Authorities 
The framework used to study the intervention of the 
French monetary authorities in the foreign exchange market 
draws on the work of Victor Argy (1982}, Jacob Frenkel 
(1978), Peter Quirk (1977), Hans Genberg (1978), and Jacques 
Artus (1976, 1978). 
These authors have used the concept 'of purchasing power 
parity (PPP) either as a determinant of the exchange rate 
(Frenkel, 1978; Genberg1 1978; Argy, 1982), or as a method 
for assessing the effect , of' 'intervention on the exchange 
rate (Argy, 1982; Quirk,, 197.7; Artus, 1976, 1978). While 
PPP remains controversial as a theory of exchange rate 
behavior, it -nevertheless remains popular and is frequently 
; 
used among economists. The Economist (April 15, 1989), also 
using the PPP concept, to model-the desired exchange rate, 
noted "We launched it (i.e., the hamburger standard of PPP) 
... as a ready reckoner of wheth~r currencies are at their 
correct exchange rates" (p-. 86) This study uses PPP to 
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model the desired exchange rate because of its resilience 
and popularity. 
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Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is an essential building 
block in the monetary or asset market approach to exchange 
rate determination. The advent of the float in 1973 led to 
renewed interest in PPP due to the belief that, upder cer-
tain conditions, the equilibrium exchange rate is determined 
by the PPP relation. Thus, if left to float freely, the 
exchange rate will tend to the equilibrium rate that main-
tains purchasing power parity. 
There are two versions of PPP: 
1. The absolute version which states that the equi-
librium exchange rate .between domestic and foreign 
currencies equals the ratio between domestic and 
foreign prices; and 
2. The relative version relates equilibrium changes 
in the exchange rate to change·s in the ratio 
between domestic and foreign prices. 
PPP is based on commodity arbitrage ensuring that 
exchange rates will not deviate from their parity level. If 
commodity prices deviated from their parity level, this 
would result in an international price discrepancy. Agents 
seeking the least expensive source for their purchases, 
would switch to the market where their buying power was the 
highest. In an internationally integrated market, commodity 
arbitrage would ensure that the pric~ of homogeneous goods 
would be equalized in all countries. 
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In a fixed exchange rate regime, the PPP theory implies 
that a country's price level is pegged to the world price 
level and must move rigidly in line with it. In a floating 
exchange rate regime, as agents switch to the market where 
they can secure the highest purchasing power for their 
money, they increase their demand for the currency of that 
market, thereby raising the exchange value of that currency 
until it is brought in line with its parity level. 
In modeling the behavior of the French monetary author-
ities, it is assumed that a purchasing power parity-based 
rule for official intervention is followed and that the 
objective of the authorities is to resist exchange rate 
changes relative to PPP by leaning against the wind. 
The intervention currency of the French authorities is 
the deutschemark (DM). In the European Monetary system 
(EMS}, members peg their currencies against each other and 
float jointly against the dollar. The intervention currency 
is most often the DM .. Dean Taylor (1982} points out that 
the French authorities att·empt to "stabilize the franc rela-
tive to the mark and other European currencies ... "because 
" the pattern of intervention suggests that the French 
monetary authorities have given priority to francjmark sta-
bilization" (p. 61). 
The model used is the Frankel (1979} Real Interest Dif-
ferential theory. It allows the nominal exchange rate and 
deviations from PPP to be determined by monetary and real 
variables and by expectations. This model is then combined 
144 
with a reaction function based on leaning against the wind 
(Quirk, 1977; Argy, 1982; Frenkel, 1978; Artus, 1978) to 
determine if foreign exchange market intervention by the 
French authorities was stabilizing or destabilizing. 
Since the objective in this'.study is not exchange rate 
prediction, as such, but the nature of intervention policy, 
this model captures the 7ssential forces-at work in the for-
eign exchange market tpat affect the behavior of the nominal 
exchange rate. 
The Frankel model follows the asset market approach to 
exchange rate determination. According to this approach, 
the exchange rate'moves to balance the international demand 
for stocks of assets rather than the international demand 
for goods, according to the traditional view. The model 
yields a theory of exchange rate determination in which the 
spot exchange Fate is expressed as a function of the rela-
tive money supplies,, relative income levels, the nominal 
interest differential and the expected long run inflation 
differential. This t~eory distinguishes be~ween the Chicago 
(Bilson-Frenkel) hypothesis and the Dornbusch hypothesis and 
shows how thes~ are special cases of the Frankel (Real 
Interest Differential) model. 
The Frankel model is based on ~xchange rate expecta-
tions and perfect bond substitutability. According to the 
model: 
d = r-r* {41) 
where 
d = forward discount if covered interest parity; 
= the expected rate of depreciat,ion if uncovered 
interest parity. 
In addition, 
d = - ¢(e -e + ~-~*) 
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(42} 
where ~ and ~* are the current rates of expected long run 
inflation at home and abroad; e is the equilibrium exchange 
rate and e is the spot rate. 
Equation '( 4 2 ) shows that, in the short run, the 
exchange rate is expected to return to its equilibrium value 
at a rate which is proportional to the gap between the cur-
rent and long run equilibrium value of the exchange rate. 
In the long run, the exchange rate is expected to depreciate 
according to the ex~ected inflation differential. 
Equations (41} and (42i yield: 
e - e = 
1 
¢ 
[(r-~)..-(r*-~*>J (43} 
Equation (43} expresse~ deviations of t?e spot exchange 
rate from the equilibrium rate'as a fun~tion of the real 
interest rate differential. From this equation, it follows 
- -* * - -* that when e = e, r-r = ~-~ ; where r and r denote the 
long run equilibrium interest rates. The equation says long 
run equality between the nominal interest rate differential 
and the expected inflation differential follows from inter-
est rate parity which ensures equality between the interest 
rate differential and expected depreciation, and long run 
purchasing power parity ensures equality between expected 
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depreciation and the inflation differential. Alternatively, 
it can be argued that in the long run, international invest-
ment flows ensure that real interest rates are equal across 
countries ,(i.e., r-1T = ~*-'ri"*). 
If the expression in brackets in Equation (43) is writ-
' * - -* . ten as [(r-r )-(r-r )], 1t shows that if the nominal 
interest differential rises above its long run level, then 
the exchange rate (units of dom~stic currency per unit of 
foreign currency) will rise proportionately above its equi-
librium level due to capital ,inflow. Hence, a positive 
relationship is expected between the exchange rate and nomi-
nal interest differential (the Keyneisian-Dornbusch hypothe-
sis). 
To complete the equation of exchange rate determination 
and account for the Chicago long run (expectations) hypothe-
' -
sis, it remains to explain e, the equilibrium exchange 
rate. Assume that purchasing power parity (PPP) holds in 
the long run so that: 
( 44) 
where p and p* are, respectively, the equilibrium price 
level at home and abroad. 
Assume a conv~ntional money demand equation 
m = p + 0y - X.r ( 45) 
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where m, p, and y are logs of money supply, price level, and 
income respectively and r is the interest rate. The equiva-
lent foreign money demand equation is: 
* * * * m = p + ¢y - Ar ( 46) 
Subtract (46) from. (45) to get: 
m-m* = p-p* + 0(y-y*) -A(r-r*) (47) 
It follows that: 
- -* - -* 
e = p-p = m-m {48) 
where bars denote equilibrium values and use has been made 
- - -* * 
of the fact that when e = e, then r-r = p-p . Equation 
(48) yields the mo~etary theory of the exchange rate which 
is shown to be determined by the relative money supplies .. 
It hypothesizes that given initial equilibrium, a given 
increase in the domestiq mo~ey s~pply relative to the for-
' . 
eign money supply yields equiproportional depreciation of 
the domestic currency. Also, a given increase in domestic 
income raises th~ demand for money and leads to domestic 
currency appreciation'. A fall in the expected rate of 
inflation raises the demand for money·and also appreciates 
the domestic currency. 
Substitute (48) into (43) and assume the current equi-
librium money supplies. and incomt~ levels are equal to their 
current levels. Then this yields a complete equation of 
exchange rate determination based on PPP as follows: 
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* e = m-m {49} 
1 
where a = and B (! \) = + h • ¢ ¢ 
Equation (49) is the Frankel equation for exchange rate 
' ' 
determination. This equation is u~ed here for the purpose 
of evaluating the intervention policy of the French authori-
ties. 
Frenkel {1978), Argy {1982},, Quirk {1977) and MacDonald 
{1988} have shown that most industrial nations pursue a 
policy of leaning against the wind by regressing a proxy for 
intervention against changes in the exchange rate. In his 
study of Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom, Argy {1982) 
has hinted at the possibility that the activity of 
government in the forei9n exchange market can affect the 
exchange rate. Al~o, Quirk (1977), in his case study of 
Japan and its policy ~f leaning against the wind, examined 
the role of Japanese intervention in the foreign exchange 
market and concluded th~t "E~timation ... did not establish 
any systematic role for the intervention variable in 
determining· change~ in the ~xchange rate." 
Artus (1978} expressed the theoretical possibility that 
the activity of government in the foreign exchange market 
could be a source of variation in the exchange rate: 
Active exchange rate policies can be and often 
have been such as to lead ultimately to a great 
deal of exchange rate instability (p. 279}. 
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With this background, an attempt is made to examine the 
scope, extent and impact of French intervention in affecting 
the exchange rate, thus indirectly contributing to devia-
tions from PPP. Our objective is to determine whether the 
effects of intervention have been stabilizing or perverse. 
To this end, an intervention variable, It, is added to 
Equation (49). Thus, 
et = B0 + B1 (m-m*) + B2 (y-y*) + B3 (r-r*) 
* + B4 (TI-TI ) + B5It + ft (50) 
A priori, B1>o; B2<o; B 3<o, according to Frankel (1979), 
though it could be positive (ibid, p. 610); B4>o; B5>o if 
intervention is to be stabilizing. If it is negative, 
intervention is destabilizing. 
In Equation (50), intervention is a determinant of the 
nominal exchange rate. At the same time, government inter-
vention is determined by exchange rate developments. The 
government intervenes to influence the exchange rate through 
a policy of "leaning against the wind" in order to moderate 
fluctuations. It can also be argued that besides leaning 
against the wind (in which the behavior of the nominal 
exchange rate determines intervention response) , interven-
tion in the foreign exchange market is motivated by other 
considerations. It might also be concerned with deviations 
of the exchange rate from a target rate compatible with 
desired real rates for international competitiveness. 
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Use is made here of models of intervention developed by 
Artus and Argy [see Almekinders and Eijffinger (1991) for 
summary]. Two equations are estimated by the Artus model--
the intervention equation and tht~ target value equation. In 
this study, additional equations are estimated since account 
is being taken of the joint.determination. The complete 
model to be estimated is as follows: 
(51a) 
(51b) 
(51c) 
(51d) 
It = Intervention 
F = France 
G = Germany 
E1t = log of nominal exchange rate (FF/DM) = et in equa-
tion (50) 
* E1t = log of trend (or target) exchange rate 
Elt-1 = lag value of El 
F price level in France Pt = 
G price level in Germany Pt = 
F 
money supply in France (in logs) Mt = 
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G 
supply in {in logs) Mt = money Germany 
F income in {in logs) Yt = France 
G income in {in logs) Yt = Germany 
F 
nominal rt = interest rates in France 
G 
nominal interest rates in rt = Germany 
eF 
expected inflation in 'ITt = France 
eG 
expected inflation in_Ger:qlany 'ITt = 
Equation ·(51a) is the central·bank intervention reac-
tion function estimated by ~rtus {1978), in which interven-
tion depends on deviations of the nominal _exchange r~te from 
·* 
target {Elt - Elt) and the change in the nominal exchange 
rate {Elt- Elt-i>· 
Equation {51b) is .the .. target value of the ~ominal ex-· 
. d 1 . . . G F 
change rate wh1ch depen s on re at1ve pr1ces {lnPt - lnPt). 
Equation {51c) is the equation for the determination of 
the nominal exchange rate based on the Frankel Real Interest 
Differential model {50). 
Eq'uation { 51d) is the equation for the determination of 
the French money supply and it is necessary because the 
French money supply {M~) is endogenously determined. 
Intervention in the foreign exchange market by the French 
monetary authorities {unless sterilized) will alter the 
French monetary base and thus.the French money supply. 
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F Hence, the French money supply (lnMt} is endogenously deter-
mined. 
This is a system with three endogenous variables (It, 
F Elt, lnMt) and three equations. In the empirical section, 
first {51b} is estimated to get the predicted value of the 
exchange rate (El*) to serve as the target value of the nom-
ina! exchange rate. Then two-stage least squares is 
G 
applied to the three equations. The instruments are lnMt, 
F G F G eF eG * (lnYt Yt), (rt- rt), Tit Tit), El, Elt_1 . Restric-
* tions are placed on the coefficients of Elt, the lagged 
value (Elt_1 ) of the nominal exchange rate, and the current 
exchange rate {Elt) so that all three sum to zero--same for 
the coefficients of money supplies in Equation {51c). 
A priori, it is expected that a 1 and a 2 are both nega-
tive. To see this, the exchange rate has been defined as 
French francs per DM (FF/DM). Thus, an increase in this 
rate [(El- Elt_1 ) is positive] means the French franc has 
depreciated. To prevent further depreciation (lean against 
the wind), the French monetary authority (Banque de France) 
intervenes by buying French francs (selling DMs); foreign 
exchange reserves decrease. Therefore, a 2 should be nega-
tive. As for a 1 , if the French franc depreciates above its 
* target value [(El-lnEl) is positive], then the French mone-
tary authority should sell OMs (buy French francs) to move 
the exchange rate towards its target value; i.e., a 1<o. 
The coefficients of the exchange rate Equation (51c} 
are expected to be as suggested by Frankel. The coefficient 
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of intervention, It, will give the impact of intervention-on 
the value of the exchange rate; i.e., whether intervention 
tends to stabilize or destapilize the French franc. If 
B5>o, then if Banque de France buys DMs (sells French 
francs), the French franc depreciates implying that inter-
~ ~ 'I I 
vention is stabilizing. If B5<o, intervention is destabi-
lizing since DMs are sqld when th~y should be bought. This 
can result from mistimed intervention due to lags in recog-
nition, administrative and implementation lags. 
An intervention reaction function by Argy (1982} [and 
The model is as follows: 
(52a) 
( 52b) 
Here again there are three endogenous variables (Elt, 
F lnMt, . It) and three equations.-
In the empirical section (Chapter III), unanticipated 
depreciation (UDt) and its lagged value (UDt_1 ) are added to_ 
' ' . ' 
Equations (51a} and (52a) on theoretical grounds. Hence, 
Equations (51a) and (52a) become respectively: 
* It= a0 + a 1 (Elt- Elt) + a 2 (Elt- Elt_1 )+ 
a3UDt + a4UDt-1 +~1 (51a') 
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It= ao + a1(Elt - Elt-1) + a2It-1 
+ a3UDt + a4UDt-1 + ~2 (52 a') 
Unanticipated depreciation (UD) is defined by Dornbusch 
(1980) as ·"the difference betw~en actual depreciation and 
interest differentials." 
Dornbusch identifies three kinds of news that are 
importa.nt determinants of the exchange rate: news about the 
current account, cyclical or demand factors and interest 
rates. His conclusion is that: 
'• 
•.. The empirical analysis confirms that unantici-
pated real and fin~ncial market disturbances bring 
about unexpected movements in the exchange rate 
(p. 56). 
The importance of Dornbusch's finding in this study is 
that French monetary authorities will intervene as a result 
of unanticipated changes in~the French ~ranc exchange rate 
relative to tbe German Mark. 
In summary, Argy's observation that causation in the 
foreign exchange market 'runs from exchange rate to interven-
tion (the usual assumption) ·.is reflected by Equations (51a) 
and (52a), while his.observation that it could run "the 
opposite way" (Argy, 1982) from intervention to'the exchange 
rate is reflected by Equations (51c) and (52b) which show 
the effect of intervention on the exchange rate. These 
equations constitute ·a simultaneous equation system for 
foreign exchange market intervention and exchange rate 
determination. These two equations from the framework for 
examining the·appropriateness of French intervention in the 
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foreign exchange market. This is part of the broader ques-
tion of looking at the implications of pegging the CFA franc 
to the French franc on the trade performance·and pattern of 
the CFA co~ntries. 
Of particular interest is the estimation of Equations 
{5lc) and {52b) which are used to test the effect of French 
intervention policy, the parame'ter ·of interest being B5 , the 
coefficient of.the intervent{on variable. This variable has 
been included because it is claimed that intervention in the 
foreign exchange. market impacts .on the value of the cur-
rency. By purs~ing a policy of leaning against the wind 
(through Equations (51a) and (52a) to offset movements of 
the exchange rate, francs will be bought when it is depreci-
ating, meaning that intervention is negative or that 
reserves are being decumul~ted, and vice versa when it is 
appreciating. The effect is·an excess demand for francs in 
the foreign exchange market which will drive up its exchange 
value in terms of ~he :r:.eference currency, the deutsche mark. 
The sign of 13 5 is important in determining the appro-
priateness of intervention: 
1. If positive, it~.implies that an increase in inter-
vention, I (i.e., reserve accumulation or a pur-
chase of DM), leads to the appreciation of the DM. 
(i.e., an increase in the French .franc/OM ex6~ange 
ratej~ ~nd ther~fore a stabilizing policy. 
2. If negative, it implies a destabilizing policy. 
Thus an appreciation (or depreciation) of the ref-
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erence currency (DM) in the foreign exchange mar-
ket is met with an accumulation (or decumulatipn) 
of reserves which in effect is perverse or desta-
bilizing. 
The necessary aata for calculating the variables are as 
follows: 
Eij = exchange value of the deutsch~.mark (DM) in terms 
qf the ·French franc obtained by dividing the 
francs-dollar (FF/$) r~t~ by the deutsche mark-
doll~r (DM/$) rat~. (Source: IMF:"IFS: Supple-
ment. on Exchange Rate.s, 1985) 
Pj = German CIP (Source: IFS: Supplement on Price 
Statistic~, 1985) 
Pi = French CPI (ibid) 
Er =Real exchange rate= Eij(Pj/Pi) 
1 = French call money. rate of interest (IFS: Yearbook: 
various isSUf?S) 
i* German call m9ney rate of interest (ibid) 
RDIFF = iG- ip(i* ~·~): 
lnMF and lnMG = log' of French and German money 
supplies, marrow definition (Source: OECD.various 
i_ssues) 
1r(1r*) = French (German) expected infl·ation proxied by long 
term government bond rates (ibid) 
It = Intervention variable: data for this variable are 
obtained from sources of the monetary base, given 
in the annual report of the National Credit Coun-
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cil (Conseil National du Credit), which reflect 
the intervention activities of the French Exchange 
Stabilization Fund (FSC) . 
The ~low form (changes in levels of reserves) is 
obtained as: 
Gold - Revaluation component of gold - current account 
of FSC 
+Foreign exchange reserves (i.e., changes in net 
foreign assets) 
+ Advances to the FSC (= Fonds de Stabilisation des 
Changes) 
+ Liability of FECOM (= European Monetary Coopera-
tion Fund) 
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